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INTRODUCTION
Involuntary removal of children from parental custody prompts social,
legislative, and constitutional concerns. Children may be removed from
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parental custody by state child-protection agencies for causes ranging from
murder of a sibling or parent, sexual abuse, nutritional deficiencies, or fail-
ure to adequately supervise the child. But then, after removal, because a
parent has a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the cus-
tody of his or her child, the state has an obligation to reunify the parent and
the child as promptly as possible and therefore may not stand idly by and
wait for the parent to rehabilitate. To safeguard constitutional guarantees,
legislation requires states to provide reasonable efforts to reunify parent and
child with a few exceptions for aggravated circumstances.' Defining what
constitutes reasonable efforts is elusive, especially when the causes for re-
moval are complex and often reoccurring, necessitating the child's reentry
into protective services. Furthermore, whatever constitutes reasonable ef-
forts is further complicated when state revenues decrease in recessionary
times.
Whenever federal and state budgets are constrained by increasing de-
mand and decreasing tax revenues, reasonable efforts at reunification may
quantitatively and qualitatively decrease. Fewer reunification services of-
fered to parents may prolong the time necessary for parents to correct the
cause or causes of the children's removal. At some point, the parents' right
to state-supplied services competes with the child's right to permanency.
Increasingly, legislation stipulates that the health and safety of the child
must be of paramount concern, not the parents' predicaments that occa-
sioned removal. Illustrative is federal legislation requiring that permanency
hearings be conducted within twelve months of any child's involuntary re-
moval.2 Furthermore, if the child remains in state custody for fifteen of the
last twenty-two months, the state must petition for termination of parental
rights. Presumptively, if the state has sufficient resources to provide a parent
with services and the parent cooperates with the state permanency plan, the
child can be reunified with the parent within the stipulated time frame. But
if reasonable efforts are reduced because of state budgetary constraints and
the federal time frame establishes fixed parameters, the possible reunifica-
tion of the parent and child decreases exponentially.
These are interesting times. State budgets have been adversely affect-
ed by a recession that began in 2008; families are adversely affected by this
recession too, resulting in greater poverty and a corresponding rise in chil-
dren being placed in protective care. Federal funding favors placing children
in foster care and then placing them for adoption if there are aggravating
circumstances or if the parent fails to cooperate with reasonable efforts at
reunification within a prescribed period of time. Note that this period will be
1. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §
101(a)(]), 94 Stat. 500 (2006); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 671 (a)(15)(B)(ii) (2006).
2. § 675(5)(C)(i).
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assessed at a permanency hearing within a few months of the child's re-
moval from the parent. Reunification is compounded by decreasing state
resources available to assist parents whose children have been removed
from their custody involuntarily, and this raises questions as to constitution-
al implications. Neither parent nor child has a private cause of action to
bring against a state for failure to provide for reasonable services. Addition-
ally, there is little-if any-federal oversight for state inadequacies in
providing reasonable efforts. Unlike in criminal matters, the indigent parent
has no constitutional right to have an attorney appointed; children have a
right to representation because of federal law, but unfortunately that repre-
sentation often is inadequate. A number of volunteer organizations have
evolved to represent children, including the Court Appointed Special Advo-
cates (CASA).3 But still at issue is what constitutes reasonable efforts on the
part of the state during a time of diminishing state resources.
This Article first concludes that there is no ascertainable standard by
which an observer may evaluate the reasonableness of state efforts. Federal
legislation lacks specifics, and state legislation varies substantially in what
is offered, who offers it, and what is expected. Second, federal and state
court decisions continue to move towards preferring the health and safety of
children over the constitutional rights of parents' custody over their chil-
dren. Third, the recession that began in 2008 is not the first time that state
budgets have decreased, prompting a decrease in the services offered to
parents. But the 2008 recession was a significant and a prolonged recession,
with child dependency consequences that may be more lasting and more
pronounced than before. Fourth, the increasing occurrence of involuntary
removal of children from parental custody requires states to acknowledge
and foster voluntary support efforts for parents and children seeking reunifi-
cation. In addition, volunteer organizations such as Court Appointed Special
Advocates need to be fostered and recognized for the hands-on service each
volunteer provides. And fifth, parents and children need effective legal rep-
resentation throughout the proceedings to maximize any state reasonable
efforts.
Overall, based on an assessment of the present efforts made by many
states described in this Article, children and parents are denied equality of
treatment when children are involuntarily removed because of conditions
associated with poverty or mental handicap. This inequality of treatment is
augmented by federal legislation, inadequate review of state efforts, and
funding mandates that support foster placement, parental rights termination,
and third-party adoption.
3. NAT'L CT. APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOC. ASS'N,
http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/c.mtJSJ7MPlsE/b.5301295/k.BE9A/Home.htm (last
visited Oct. 29, 2013).
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I. THE PROCESS OF DEPENDENCY
A. Constitutional Guarantees
Children may be involuntarily removed from the custody of their par-
ents; also, the parent may voluntarily surrender the child to the state. In ei-
ther situation, the child, upon removal by state authorities, is then termed a
dependent child4 or a "[c]hild in need of protection . . . [and] services."5
Thereafter, unless the parent consents to termination of parental rights, the
parent retains a right under the United States Constitution to the custody of
his or her child. This right is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and is a fundamental right.6
4. See, e.g., In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 850 (Pa. 2000). The court defines a depend-
ent child under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 as:
A child who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required
by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental or emotion-
al health, or morals;
(2) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law;
(3) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other custodian;
(4) is without parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
Id. (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (1999)).
5. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.007 (2009). Minnesota defines a child in need of
protection or services as a child who:
(1) is abandoned or without parent, guardian, or custodian;
(2) (i) has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse. . . , (ii) resides with or has
resided with a victim of child abuse . . . , (iii) resides with or would reside
with a perpetrator of domestic child abuse .... or (iv) is a victim of emotional
maltreatment as defined in subdivision 15;
(3) is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care
for the child's physical or mental health or morals because the child's parent,
guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to provide for that care;
(4) is without the special care made necessary by a physical, mental, or emotional
condition because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or un-
willing to provide that care;
(5) is medically neglected, which includes, but is not limited to, the withholding
of medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening
condition ... ;
(6) is one whose parent, guardian, or other custodian for good cause desires to be
relieved of the child's care and custody. .;
(7) has been placed for adoption or care in violation of law;
(8) is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or physical
disability, or state of immaturity of the child's parent, guardian, or other cus-
todian.
Id.
6. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (protecting a parent's
right to child rearing, education, and religion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51
(1972) (discussing a parent's right to raise a child); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (stating "that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside[s] first in the par-
1032 2013:1029
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Prior to any consideration of the best interest of the child, courts
looked to the right of the parent to raise the child and held that almost al-
ways it is in the best interest of the child to remain with the parent.7 Even
when the child is involuntarily removed from the custody of the parent be-
cause of a specified condition, the parent retains a fundamental right to the
custody of his or her child. The Supreme Court has stated that "It]he fun-
damental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and man-
agement of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State."8 The nature of this fundamental right means that "[f]irst and fore-
most, the [state agency] must consider returning the child to the child's nat-
ural parents or guardians" upon involuntary removal.9
In practical application, the fundamental right of parents to the custo-
dy of their children provides minimal assistance when a child is removed
from their home because there are clear and convincing circumstances sug-
gesting abuse, neglect, or abandonment.' In addition, once the child is re-
moved "[t]he state is clearly in control in neglect proceedings, for not only
does it present the case to the court, but its 'adversary,' the parent, is [also]
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the legal proceedings."" As one commen-
tator writes, "families involved in neglect proceedings are overwhelmingly
poor." 2 "Even if the [child protective service] is sensitive to [the] issues"
that poverty precipitates, "[t]he cycle of poverty . .. is difficult for any
family to break."' 3 One scholar has suggested that
[blecause there is much less room for error in poor families, virtually any small
set-back can trigger another allegation of neglect. Furthermore, the same deficien-
ents"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the right to raise a child
is a "basic civil right[]" of a parent). Likewise, state courts have ruled that parents have a
fundamental right to raise a child. See, e.g., In re Mark M., 782 A.2d 332, 342 (Md. 2001)
(holding that "[a] parent's interest in raising a child is ... a fundamental right"); Boswell v.
Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 668 (Md. 1998) (holding that "[a] parent has a fundamental right to
the care and custody of his or her child").
7. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11, 34 (1905).
8. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). But see Raymond C. O'Brien,
An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV.
1209 (1994) (arguing that dependent children deserve greater constitutional due process
independence from parents).
9. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 642 A.2d 201, 204-05 (Md. 1994) (per
curiam).
10. In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 & J9711031, 796 A.2d 778, 782
(Md. 2002).
11. Id. at 782.
12. Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2294 (1998).
13. Id. at 2296.
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cies that initially led to the charges of neglect-such as poor housing, lack of child
care, lack of transportation, and stress-can make complying with the child wel-
fare agency's service plan extremely difficult. Nevertheless, such compliance is
critical to reunifying and preserving the family unit.
14
Because the state's removal of the child is civil in nature, the parents
lack the constitutional guarantee of the appointment of an attorney if they
cannot afford one. 5 Parents derive some protection, however, from termina-
tion proceedings through the level of proof required to terminate parental
rights: the state cannot terminate parental rights without establishing that
there is at least clear and convincing evidence. 6 Children are entitled to
some protection in dependency proceedings, as there are state and federal
statutes requiring the appointment of attorneys or volunteers. The federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), first enacted in 1974,
requires states to document in any state dependency plan the provision for
appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the child's best interests in every
case of abuse or neglect that results in a judicial proceeding. 7 Congress
reauthorized CAPTA in 2010 and strengthened the requirement that each
court-appointed guardian ad litem, attorney, or CASA receive training so as
14. Id. at 2296-97.
15. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (holding that failure
to appoint counsel to represent the parent in a parental termination proceeding did not violate
the Due Process Clause). Many states do provide an attorney in civil dependency adjudica-
tions. See, e.g., In re J.W., 2013-Ohio-468 (holding that the indigent stepfather of children
who were the subject of a dependency adjudication was entitled to appointed counsel in the
custody proceeding). But see In re C.M., 48 A.3d 942, 945, 950 (N.H. 2012) (upholding the
right of a state's legislature to abolish appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every
civil dependency hearing and stating that "a determination of whether appointed counsel is
necessary to adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation should be made on a case-
by-case basis in the first instance by the trial court"); Dep't of Family Servs. v. Currier, 2013
WY 16, 295 P.3d 837, 839 (Wyo. 2013) (finding "that due process [does not] require[] the
state to provide an indigent [obligor] with [appointed] counsel in a civil contempt proceeding
for non-payment of child support[, even] when incarceration is one of the possible penal-
ties").
16. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that a state statute
that permitted the termination of parental rights based on a preponderance of the evidence
violated the Due Process Clause).
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5106a (2006); see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ABOUT CAPTA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2011),
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/about.pdf. When Congress amend-
ed CAPTA in 1996, the new legislation specified that the guardian ad litem may be an attor-
ney or a Court Appointed Special Advocate. This legislation initiated the movement to pro-
vide each child "an independent voice to advocate for his/her 'best interests."' Hollis R.
Peterson, Comment, In Search of the Best Interests of the Child: The Efficacy of the Court
Appointed Special Advocate Model of Guardian Ad Litem Representation, 13 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2006).
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to be able to make appropriate recommendations to the court concerning the
child's best interests."
B. Advocates
The guardian ad litem (GAL) may be an attorney or a volunteer with
appropriate training. 9 Each state has adopted CAPTA guidelines in whole
or in part, but "adherence to its GAL appointment mandates and adequate
GAL training remains a problem."20 Nebraska evaluated its GAL system in
2009, and the resulting findings offer insight into one state's program.2 1 The
report was issued in response to a 2008 request by the state legislature to
18. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii). CAPTA's funding has not increased since
2005. States receive CAPTA grants to improve the state's Child Protective Services system.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is tasked with "address[ing] best
practices in differential response through dissemination of information, research, [and] train-
ing of personnel." AM. HUMANE AsS'N, ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FY 2012 BUDGET 3
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 BUDGET ANALYSIS], available at
http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/fy-2012-budget-analysis-children.pdf.
19. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
(2012) [hereinafter REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN], available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/represent.pdf (providing a
summary of state statutes pertaining to representation of children, training of volunteers, and
compensation). The report states "[a]pproximately 41 States, the District of Columbia, Amer-
ican Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands provide for the appointment of a GAL to
represent the best interests of the child." Id. at 2-3.
20. See Gerard F. Glynn, The Child's Representation Under CAPTA: It Is Time for
Enforcement, 6 NEV. L.J. 1250, 1251 (2006); Marcia Robinson Lowry & Sara Bartosz, Why
Children Still Need a Lawyer, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 199 (2007); Emily Richardson,
Comment, Lawyers Were Children Once: An Ethical Approach to Strengthening Child Abuse
and Neglect Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 357, 362 (2007); Donald N. Duquette with Julian
Darwall, Child Representation in America: Progress Report from the National Quality Im-
provement Center, 46 FAM. L.Q. 87, 89 (2012). See generally Donald N. Duquette & Ann M.
Haralambie, Representing Children and Youth, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE:
REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
DEPENDENCY CASES (Donald N. Duquette & Ann M. Haralambie eds., 2d ed. 2010). See also
LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency
Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 609-10 (2009).
21. See ERIK S. PITCHAL, MADELYN D. FREUNDLICH & CORENE KENDRICK, NAT'L
Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, EVALUATION OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM SYSTEM IN
NEBRASKA (2009) [hereinafter NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT], available at
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/nebraska/final-nebraska-g
al_report 12.pdf. "[l]n October 2009, the national children's advocacy organization First
Star ... released a report ranking the ... quality of [each state's] legal representation for
abused and neglected children. Nebraska received a score of 76 out of 100"; in a previous
report, Nebraska had scored 73 out of 100. Id. at 16-17. The problems cited as afflicting
Nebraska were: (I) vague description of the role of GALs; (2) no mandatory training; (3)
lack of continuity of counsel for each child; and (4) lack of a statutory fight for the child to
be present at all child protective, foster care, or dependency hearings. id. at 17.
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evaluate the state's GAL system on fifteen different measures and then to
offer recommendations to improve performance. 2 Nebraska law defines a
GAL as an attorney licensed to practice law by the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska." "[T]he GAL is expected [first,] to represent the child's best inter-
ests before the court[; second, to] . . . 'defend the legal and social interests'
of the child[;] and [third, to] 'act as counsel for the juvenile."'24 To qualify,
an attorney GAL must complete an initial six hours of specialized training
provided by the Administrative Office of the Court and then undergo three
additional hours of specialized training each year to maintain eligibility.
Overall, and not limited to Nebraska, lack of training in the complex field of
child dependency is a major deficiency in providing adequate reasonable
efforts to children and their parents.
Nebraska's state statute and policy intend that a GAL should act as an
attorney for the child. 6 It asserts that the "GAL has the right to file motions,
present evidence and witnesses, cross-examine witness[es], file petitions on
behalf of the child to terminate the parent's parental rights, and to move the
court to order treatment and services for the child."27 State law further speci-
fies that the "GAL must attend all hearings, meet with the child within two
weeks of appointment and every six months thereafter, submit a written
report at every disposition and review hearing, and make recommendations
to the court."28 The counties in the state provide for appointment of the GAL
and for compensation. 9 Judges or their designated representatives appoint
the GAL from a list of approved attorneys; compensation varies according
to the county, but in 2006, the GAL was paid, on average, around $70 per
hour.3"
22. Id. at vi-vii.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-272.01(2)(a)-(b), 43-272(3) (Supp. 2012)).
25. NEB. CT. R. § 4-401. State guidelines relating to training of GALs nonetheless
permit a judge to appoint an attorney with no training as a GAL "if the judge determines that
an attorney with the training required herein is unavailable within the county." Id.
26. Commentators favor a client-directed role for attorneys. See Duquette with
Darwall, supra note 20, at 98-100 ("[T]hat a lawyer should take direction from his or her
child client if the child is determined to have developed the cognitive capacity to engage in
reasoned decision making.").
27. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 12 (citing NEB. REv. STAT. §
43-272.01(2)).
28. Id. (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272.01(2)).
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 13. "According to information gathered by the ABA Center on Children
and the Law in 2006 .... most jurisdictions pay in the range of $50 to $70 per hour." Id. at
61. "Some have differentials for in-court . . . time, and some have per-case maximums. At
the high end, Nevada and Kentucky pay $100 per hour; at the low end, Rhode Island pays
$30 per hour." Id. "Colorado currently pays $65 per hour." Id.
In 33 states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, and Guam, fees and ex-
penses for attorney and/or GAL services are paid by the court handling the case. In
1036 2013:1029
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A GAL must be appointed whenever a judge signs a temporary custo-
dy order directing that the child has been or will be removed from the
home.3 At this point, the caseworker assigned must develop a case plan for
the child and for the family.32 "The case plan provides [for] the safety, well-
being, and permanency goals for the child and states what the parents and
the agency must do so the child remains in foster care no longer than is ab-
solutely necessary."33 After the GAL's appointment, state law requires that
he or she meet with the child, the caseworker assigned, and the foster parent
or caretaker for the child. Meeting with anyone else is optional, based on
whether someone else may have information pertaining to why the child has
been declared a dependent child.3
After the court signs the temporary ex parte custody order, often there
is a pre-hearing conference at which the process will be explained to the
parent, possible kinship placements for the child are identified, and reason-
able efforts to reunify the family are discussed.36 The GAL is required to be
present at the pre-hearing conference and then at the subsequent temporary
custody hearing.37 At this temporary custody hearing, usually within ten or
fourteen days after state intervention, the county attorney must prove the
allegations resulting in the child's removal or assumption of legal custody
by the state by a preponderance of the evidence.38 Then, following the tem-
porary custody hearing, there is an adjudication hearing held within ninety
days.39 The purpose of this hearing is to prove the allegations made by at
least a preponderance of the evidence; the GAL is able to present evidence,
witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses at this hearing.' If parents admit to
the charges, the process goes directly to the dispositional hearing.' At this
six States and American Samoa, these costs are funded by the State; in 15 States,
expenses are paid by the county. To the extent that they are able to pay, the court in
22 States and Guam may require the parent or guardian of the child or other appro-
priate party to reimburse the court for any attorney or GAL fees that have been
paid. In Tennessee and American Samoa, the person found responsible for the
abuse or neglect is required to pay these expenses.
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN, supra note 19, at 7-8.




35. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272.01(2)(d) (Supp. 2012). "GAL guidelines promulgated
by the Nebraska Supreme Court" state that a GAL shall "meet with the child 'prior to any
hearing at which substantive issues affecting the juvenile's legal or best interests are antici-
pated to be addressed by the court."' NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
36. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 19.
37. Id. at 20, 23.
38. See In re Corey P., 697 N.W.2d 647, 656 (Neb. 2005).
39. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
40. Id. at 23-24.
41. See id. at 24.
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hearing, the state submits a case plan, and the court may order it to be im-
plemented or offer modifications. The GAL has the right to object to the
plan, offer suggested revisions, or recommend an alternative plan.43
Six months after the adoption of the case plan at the dispositional
hearing, an initial review is held.' Another will be held every six months
thereafter.45 At these hearings, the court reviews
the status of the case, including the progress made by the parent(s) in complying
with the case plan, whether DHHS has provided the services that the court ordered
at the dispositional hearing, and the case plan and any changes needed to the case
plan; the court acts to ensure the child is spending as little time as possible in foster
care.
46
Prior to the review, the GAL must submit a written report and a rec-
ommendation that is based on the GAL's meeting with the child and any
existent reports on the child.47 The GAL is also expected to present evi-
dence, object to any adverse recommendations, and advocate for the child's
presence at the hearing.48
Twelve months after the dispositional hearing, a permanency hearing
must be held.49 At this hearing, the court decides "whether the parent(s) and
child are receiving and participating in [state] services and sets a permanen-
cy goal for the child."5 Based on the evidence thus far, the county attorney
or the GAL may petition "the court for termination of parental rights so that
[the] child may be freed for adoption."'" The Nebraska study, based on sur-
veys of participants in the system, reported that few GALs petition to termi-
nate parental rights because of
a feeling that it should be up to [the state] and the county attorney to decide when
to terminate parental rights[] and a culture in the community that parents' rights
should not be terminated so long as they are making an effort to improve, regard-
less of the federal law requirements that a [termination] petition be filed if a child
has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.
52
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-285(2) (Supp. 2012).
43. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 24.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-278).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing GUIDELINES FOR GUARDIANS AD LITEM FOR JUVENILES IN JUVENILE
COURT PROCEEDINGS III.C.5, V.B. 1, .C. 1-2, .D.4. (2007), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/print/book/export/htmlV5177).
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id.; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1312(3).
51. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 27.
52. Id. Reference to the time frame for termination is occasioned by the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act. See id. at ix.
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When the National Association of Counsel for Children evaluated the
GAL system in Nebraska, it concluded that the structure then existing re-
sulted in "uneven performance and lack of accountability."53 And while the
report concluded that there are individual GALs able to overcome structural
problems and provide good service, overall, the average level of service was
not ideal.54
Any deficiency in the services provided by the GALs is augmented by
the fact that the parents are often victims of poverty, mental disease, alcohol
or drug dependencies, or adverse social interactions." They therefore often
lack appreciation of counseling and other therapeutic services. In a study of
North Carolina family-reunification programs for state fiscal year 2007, it
was reported that
over two thirds (70%) of identified caretakers were female. The majority (71%) of
identified caretakers were the mother[s] of the children removed from the home,
and 25% were identified as the children's father. The majority of identified care-
takers were White (58%). 32% were African-American, and 10% comprised other
minority races. The average age of identified caretakers served by the program was
32 years.... Only 34% of identified caretakers were employed in full-time work,
53. Id. at vi; see also Kasey L. Wassenaar, Defenseless Children: Achieving Compe-
tent Representation for Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings Through Statutory Re-
form in South Dakota, 56 S.D. L. REV. 182, 201-02 (2011) (detailing a recent study of attor-
ney performance in Nebraska in reference to representing children); Katherine Hunt Federle
& Danielle Gadomski, The Curious Case of the Guardian Ad Litem, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV.
337, 339-48 (2011) (surveying the history of the guardian ad litem model).
54. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at vi ("[O]verall, GALs are not
visiting their clients; they are not zealously advocating for appropriate permanency for their
clients; they are not making their clients' position known to the court; they are not using
independent experts to assist them in understanding their clients and in presenting alternative
service plans to the court; they are not actively investigating their clients' education needs;
and they are not receiving sufficient training or supervision."). Furthermore:
[r]esearchers have identified both systemic and individual attorney problems that
have contributed to poor representation of children . . . [such as] unavailability of
training or consultation for inexperienced attorneys, the appointment of different
attorneys for the same child at different hearings, delayed attorney appointments,
low rate of compensation for attorneys, and a shortage of attorneys willing to rep-
resent children.
Peterson, supra note 17, at 1097-98 (citing Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Monitoring
Attorney Performance and Evaluating Program Outcomes: A Case Study of Attorneys for
Abused and Neglected Children, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1988); see also U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CSR, INC., NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF
GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS (1988)); Andrea
Khoury, Why a Lawyer?-The Importance of Client-directed Legal Representation for
Youth, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 277, 278-79 (2010) (arguing that what is needed is an attorney-
client model for child advocacy).
55. RAYMOND S. KIRK & DIANE P. GRIFFITH, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES ON
THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION PROGRAMS FOR STATE FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 8-10 (2008), avail-
able at http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdmref/collection/p249901 co1122/id/46 1537.
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and one-third (36%) of identified caretakers were unemployed and in need of
work. Half (50%) of all identified caretakers had less than a high school diploma.
56
The most frequently occurring precipitating causes placing the child in
an at-risk category were "child abuse/neglect, unemployment, domestic
violence, drug abuse, grief/loss, mental illness, and alcohol abuse."57
Children described as at-risk may be characterized as follows:
Fewer than half (47%). . . were male and ... [t]he average age of the child was 6
years. Forty-five percent of the children were White, one-third (36%) were African
American, and other minority children represented 20% of the children served. The
majority (87%) of children were in [state] legal custody due to neglect. The most
frequently cited issues placing children at-risk for role dysfunction include neglect,
family disruption, and family violence. Other issues affecting between 10% and
20% of children include grief or loss, being undisciplined, being out of parental
control, and drug abuse.
58
Even prior to the recession that occurred in 2008, there were indica-
tions that reasonable efforts offered by the state to promote parent-child
reunification were strained. " This is illustrated in a report compiled for the
North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services. The report doc-
uments that in 2004, time spent on reunifying families where children were
at risk was 181 hours per case.' By 2007, this number dropped to 125 hours
per case.6' As two scholars note:
There is no apparent reason in the program data for this time reduction, although it
may be related to budget issues or administrative decisions .... Whatever the rea-
son, there is an ongoing trend indicating a reduction in intensity of service (and
therefore, dose) and a concomitant decrease in program success with respect to re-
unification.
62
H1. FEDERAL CHILD-WELFARE GOALS
A. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
Prior to 1980, federal subsidies to the states for child welfare were
provided through Part B of Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935.63
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) sig-
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 14.
59. See id. at 45-46.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden
Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 267 (2003); see
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 101(a)(l), 94
Stat. 500 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 620 (2006) (repealed 2006). -
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naled a significant shift in federal priorities. 6' The AACWA mandated that,
in order to receive federal funds for foster care, the state must provide a
written case plan for each child for whom the state seeks federal mainte-
nance payments.65 This plan must provide a description of the placement, a
discussion of the appropriateness of the placement, and a description of the
reasonable services provided to the parents to facilitate the return of the
child to his or her home or to establish another permanent placement for the
child.66 The AACWA also specifies that the state must implement first, an
administrative review of the placement plan at least every six months and,
second, a judicial review no later than eighteen months after the initial
placement and periodically thereafter.67 These procedures do not apply if,
upon involuntary removal from the custody of the parents, the child is
placed with relatives. This placement is termed "kinship care," and at the
judicial review, the court may grant a state's petition to award the relatives
guardianship over the child pending reunification.68 Then, if there is at least
clear and convincing evidence of the parent's failure to cooperate with state
efforts to be determined at a subsequent hearing, the parent's parental rights
may be terminated, and the child can be placed for adoption with other par-
ties.69
64. The Act has been defined as:
[A] blueprint for combined efforts of the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches of government to preserve families and, if necessary, build new families
for children. It requires that states recruit culturally diverse foster and adoptive
families; provide reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of
the child from his home or to make it possible for the child to return to his home;
establish standards for foster family homes and review the standards periodically;
set goals and a plan for the number of children in foster care; and have a data col-
lection and reporting system about the children in care.
Peterson, supra note 17, at 1091.
65. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act § 471(a)(16). Prior to passage of the
Act in 1980, the federal government provided support for some types of child-welfare ser-
vices through Part B of Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935 and Part E of Title IV of
the Social Security Act, known as the Foster Care Maintenance Payments Program and the
Adoption Assistance Program. See 45 C.F.R. § 1357 (2012) (providing the specific regula-
tions). See Crossley, supra note 63, at 270.
66. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act § 475(1).
67. Id. § 475(5)(B)-(C). Judicial review is required to decide if the child should be
reunified with the parents, if the court should terminate the parental rights and place the child
up for adoption, or if the child should continue in foster care. Id. § 475(5)(C).
68. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 303(a).
69. When implementing the 1980 Federal Act, one Maryland court described the
procedural process as follows:
Under the federal act, a state is required, among other things, to provide a written
case plan for each child for whom the state claims federal foster care maintenance
payments. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16). The case plan must include a description of the
home or institution into which the child is placed, a discussion of the appropriate-
ness of the placement, and a description of the services provided to the parents,
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One of the reasons why Congress enacted the AACWA of 1980 was to
curb "foster care drift."7 At the time of its enactment, more than 500,000
children resided in foster care while child-protective agencies worked with
families by providing services and an open time frame for modification of
adverse behavior. The "AACWA sought to end the stagnation and indeci-
sion keeping children in foster homes [not only] by requiring states to make
reasonable efforts to reunite families" but also by providing a test for failure
to respond to those services.71 Taken as a whole, the 1980 Legislation sup-
ported family reunification, providing services to keep the child in the home
or to reunify that family if the child was removed. As long as the child was
safe, the primary goal of any state reasonable efforts was to preserve the
family structure. What constituted "reasonable efforts" under the statute was
left to the state to determine without any mandate in the federal statute. The
Legislation did mandate, however, a time frame that the state had to follow:
an eighteen-month permanency plan was required.72
Initially, the Legislation had the desired effect, and within five years
of its passage, the AACWA reduced the number of children in foster care to
270,000. 73 But success was short-lived, and by 1997 the number of children
child and foster parents to facilitate return of the child to his or her own home or to
establish another permanent placement for the child. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1). The state
must also implement a case review system that provides for administrative review
of the case plan at least every six months and judicial review no later than eighteen
months after placement and periodically thereafter. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) and (C).
The purpose of the judicial review is to "determine the future status of the child"
including whether the child should be returned to its biological parents, continued
in foster care for a specified period, placed for adoption, or because of the child's
special needs or circumstances, continued in foster care on a long term basis. 42
U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 & J9711031, 796 A.2d 778, 784 (Md. 2002).
See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CASE PLANNING FOR FAMILIES INVOLVED WITH CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES (2010), available
at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/caseplanning.pdf.
70. See Bailie, supra note 12, at 2289 (citing Martin Guggenheim, The Effect of
Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-
An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 122-25 (1995) (offering further
explanation of this term)).
71. Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L.
REV. 321, 325 (2005).
72. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §
101(a)(1), 94 Stat. 500 (2006)
73.
The reasonable efforts initiative began as an endeavor to ensure that states provid-
ed an adequate level of social services to families before removing children from
their homes. This endeavor addressed the concern that Child Protective Services
(CPS) case managers were unnecessarily placing children in foster care, and thus
contributing to the growth of the nation's foster care population.
Crossley, supra note 63, at 260-61.
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in foster care had swelled to more than 500,000 once again.74 Critics of state
reasonable efforts, the pro-family mentality of the 1980 Act, and the process
as a whole, argued that state agencies were too focused on repairing dys-
functional families instead of finding a permanent home for children lan-
guishing in foster care.75 The subsequent federal legislation would focus
more on what is a reasonable placement for the child and less on reasonable
efforts to correct parents' behavior.
B. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
In 1997 Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA),76 which shifted the focus from reunifying the family to permanen-
cy, health, and safety for children.77 The policy is reflected in this statement:
"Foremost, Congress sought to shift the pendulum of the child protection
system away from what many saw as an unreasonable emphasis on family
preservation and towards permanency, and thus health and safety, for the
children." 8 While the 1997 ASFA appears to be a continuation of reasona-
ble efforts to reunify the family,79 the focus is no longer primarily on
providing services to families. Instead, the legislation's goal is to achieve
permanency for children and at an accelerated pace. The only exceptions in
this permanency plan occur in the event that: (1) "the child is being cared
for by a relative"; (2) child protective services documents a compelling rea-
son for why a parental termination petition should not be initiated; or (3) the
state does not provide "to the family of the child, consistent with the time
period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary for
the safe return of the child to the child's home" when such services are war-
ranted.80
74. Stephanie Jill Gendell, A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 25 (2001).
75. See Bean, supra note 71, at 326.
76. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 67 l(a)(15)(B)(ii)
(2006).
77. The Act has been described as embodying three core principles: the safety of
children, the notion that foster care is a temporary setting and not a place for children to grow
up, and the belief that permanency planning should begin upon the child's entry into foster
care. Peterson, supra note 17, at 1092.
78. Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA,
29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 224 (2009).
79. The Act begins by stating that the child's health and safety shall be of paramount
concem, then appears to reapply the goals of the 1980 legislation by specifying that reasona-
ble efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families, including eliminating the necessity
of removing the child from the home prior to placing the child in kinship care or foster care.
The Act then returns, however, to the child's right to permanence by specifying when rea-
sonable efforts need not be made and permitting aggravated circumstances to justify not
permitting any services to a parent. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(1 5)(A)-(D) (2006).
80. Id. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
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The 1997 ASFA legislation focused on the health and safety of the
child as the paramount concern, but the emphasis was on permanency for
the child as soon as possible. Three additional features contained in the new
legislation illustrate this fact. First, specific deadlines are established. Alt-
hough the 1980 legislation required a permanency plan within eighteen
months, the 1997 Act specifies a twelve-month period for the state to hold a
permanency hearing." This shorter period of time lessens the opportunity
for any beneficial results from state reasonable efforts expended to reunite
the family; concomitantly, the shorter time frame lessens the time that a
child will spend in foster care while waiting for parental conduct to im-
prove. Also, the new legislation requires the state to petition a court for ter-
mination of parental rights if a child resides in foster care for fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months.8" Thus, if a child is returned to the parents
only to be removed again, the short period at home does not necessitate a
new start to the time frame for termination. Third and finally, if reasonable
services to reunite the family are not required because of aggravated cir-
cumstances, a permanency plan for the child's placement must be held with-
in thirty days of that decision to deny services.83 This is an important new
feature of the ASFA because it permits easier termination of parental rights.
The ASFA dispenses with the need to provide reasonable services
whenever the parent's rights over a sibling of the dependent child have been
terminated involuntarily.8' Keeping with the intent of the 1997 Legislation,
this contributes to a speedier permanency plan for the child. And similarly,
the third feature occurs whenever a court has determined that "the parent
has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law,
which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, tor-
ture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse). 8 5 This aggravated circumstances
feature of the 1997 Legislation follows the theme that "in determining rea-
sonable efforts to be made with respect to a child ... the child's health and
safety shall be the paramount concern."86 In addition, "[n]othing in [the Act]
shall be construed as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion
to protect the health and safety of children in individual cases," including
81. See id. Note, however, that the court may appoint a legal guardian as part of the
permanency plan. See id. § 675(5)(E).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i). States may have difficulty in formulating when reunifica-
tion efforts are not required. See, e.g., Melissa R. v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 49
(Ct. App. 2012) (holding that California had to provide reunification services to a parent who
had failed to reunify with a child and then lost parental rights over the child in another state,
Wisconsin, even though such a failure would have justified withholding services if it had
occurred in California).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
85. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
86. Id. § 671 (a)(15)(A).
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those listed as aggravated circumstances.87 As commentators have noted,
this provision of the 1997 legislation incorporates features of the Child
Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 1996, which identifies certain
"aggravated circumstances" that involve another child or a parent of the
child and that create a presumption that providing reasonable services to a
parent should be omitted.88
Throughout the ASFA, the emphasis is on the permanency of the child
in a safe home rather than on providing the extensive services necessary to
make the existing home safe for the child's reunification with the parents.
This is the essence of the conflict. There are those who argue for a speedy
resolution to benefit the child and society versus those who argue that more
and better resources should be offered to parent-child reunification. The
following is illustrative of the former argument:
Increased adoption from foster care is a way of decreasing the number of young
people who must spend much of their youth in unstable and less than ideal living
arrangements. It may also be a way of preventing the long-term detrimental conse-
quences of such an upbringing .... Despite the risks involved, sizable numbers of
middle-class couples are prepared to adopt these maltreated children .... There
would be benefits for both the children who await adoption and for U.S. society as
a whole if adoption of children in foster care by qualified non-relatives were made
easier, faster, and more frequent. Yet advocates of family preservation have resist-
ed efforts to make it so.
89
Critics of speedier resolution, and particularly the aggravated circum-
stances exception to providing reasonable services, argue that children are
87. Id. § 678.
88. Child Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235,
110 Stat. 3063 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5109 (Supp. V 2005)). The Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act simply codified several criminal acts defined in CAPTA as being
sufficient to preclude offering services to reunify the family. These criminal acts include
murder of another child of the parent, voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent,
aiding in the commission of such a murder or voluntary manslaughter, or committing a felo-
ny assault to the child or another child of the parent. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii). See Bean, supra
note 78, at 248-55, 264-83 (commenting on the codification of these acts as precluding reuni-
fication).
89. NICHOLAS ZILL, CTR. ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADOPTION FROM FOSTER CARE:
AIDING CHILDREN WHILE SAVING PUBLIC MONEY 2-3 (2011), available at
http://www.firststar.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZMo29x7Bdcc%3D&tabid=146. The
article uses surveys from the federal National Survey of Adoptive Parents to illustrate that
[c]hildren adopted from foster care are substantially better off in terms of family
resources than children who live with their birth mothers only, particularly single
mothers who have never married. . . . Even though they live in more favorable
home environments, children adopted from foster care cost the public less money
than children living in foster care families. This is because adoptive parents are
more likely than foster parents to be working outside the home on a full-time basis
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being removed too quickly and without meeting constitutional protections.
An aggravated circumstance is far too nebulous, permitting the withholding
of reasonable efforts without "requir[ing] child-specific harm to the subject-
child."' Critics argue that the aggravated circumstances exception "invites
inconsistent, unpredictable decisions about when a state should expend ef-
forts to reunite a child with his or her parents."' In other words, the state
court is permitted to speculate on what a court may determine to be aggra-
vated circumstances and other similar circumstances and may therefore
deem sufficient reasonable efforts are not required prior to termination of
parental rights.
This use of conjecture may be appropriate in criminal proceedings de-
fined under the Child Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 1996.92
However, when children are removed from a home and subject to the ASFA
of 1997, it is often because of chronic problems, which, although serious,
may be able to be addressed through reasonable efforts provided.93 For ex-
ample:
Parents who have neglected a child as a result of a drug addiction... may be able
to submit test results to show they are no longer doing drugs. While not proving
lasting change, the evidence does establish a drug-free status quo and may suggest
a diminished risk to the child should reunification occur.
94
The suggestion is made that prior to the denial of reasonable efforts
based on one of the aggravated circumstances listed in the ASFA, the court
must be satisfied that harm to the child is likely imminent if reunification is
attempted.95 A nexus must exist, however, "between the harm the parent has
already created and the harm predicted to the subject-child should reunifica-
tion efforts be attempted. Finally, the predicted harm must be of sufficient
magnitude to justify denying reasonable efforts."96 While laudable, the sug-
gestion made by Professor Bean is but a suggestion, and the language of the
federal legislation used in the context of the statutory time frames "may
actually work to tear apart families who would otherwise have succeeded in
rebuilding their lives."97
90. Bean, supra note 78, at 277.
91. See, e.g., id. at 227, 277 (identifying New Jersey and Oregon as two states that
require specific harm to a child prior to withholding reasonable services to the family). See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 234-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003); State v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705-06 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
92. Bean, supra note 78, at 255.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 283.
96. Id.
97. Bailie, supra note 12, at 2293. See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos.
J9610436 & J9711031, 796 A.2d 778, 782 (Md. 2002) ("Unfortunately, poverty is also a
deeply-routc2 problem and, thus, one that cannot be alleviated quickly. As such, the
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A comparison of the two federal legislative efforts just discussed illus-
trates that federal policy regarding children and reunification efforts shifted
between 1980 and 1997. What is consistent in both statutes is the continued
absence of firm federal guidance as to what is required when a state is told
to provide reasonable efforts with respect to a dependent child. The ASFA
of 1997 further challenged parental custody rights by shortening the periods
of planning and specifying a time frame for parents to rectify problems or
suffer termination of their parental rights. In addition, the 1997 Statute's
uncertainty of what constitutes aggravated circumstances, thereby preclud-
ing the requirement of reunification services, diminishes the possibility of a
workable and long-term response to the difficulties the child faced in the
parent's home. This, coupled with decreasing state revenues, increasing
numbers of children entering child protective service, and lopsided federal
subsidies for foster care and adoption assistance create an adverse environ-
ment for parents who are poor, marginalized, or simply unassisted. It has
become the responsibility of the states to assess what constitutes reasonable
efforts, determine the parameters of aggravated circumstances, and balance
the constitutional rights of the parents against the pending federal deadlines
promoting a quick, permanent solution.
III. STATE RESPONSES TO FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Establishing Child Dependency
Prior to 1982, states varied in both their approach to what level of
proof was necessary to deprive a parent of the custody of his or her child
and also with what was necessary to terminate a parent's rights in the child.
A few states permitted parents to lose custody of their children and then to
have their parental rights terminated upon a showing by the state of a mere
fair preponderance of the evidence. This is the lowest level of proof, less
than clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt. But in 1982 the
United States Supreme Court held that when terminating a parent's rights to
his or her child, "the 'fair preponderance of the evidence' standard ... vio-
lates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."98 From then
onward, in order to terminate a parent-child relationship, at least a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard of proof must be present.99 Commenta-
tors suggested that the Court's requirement of a higher standard of proof
resulted in part from a decision the previous year holding that parents did
[ASFA's] new time lines for child protective cases may actually work to tear apart families
who would otherwise have succeeded in rebuilding their lives.").
98. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
99. Id. at 748.
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not have a right to a state-appointed attorney in a civil termination of paren-
tal rights hearing."°
The higher standard of proof announced in the 1982 decision was
viewed by the Court as protecting a fundamental right of a parent; it also
served as a bulwark to provide protection for parents who are often poorly
educated and forced to confront extensive state resources when their chil-
dren have been removed from their home. The Court expounded on the idea
that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custo-
dy, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to
the State."'0 ' With that said, the rights of parents must be balanced against
the rights of children who are entitled to protection from physical abuse and
neglect. When a child is civilly removed from the care and custody of a
parent, the goal of the state's courts and social service agencies is first to
provide protection from harm. This goal continues as the state provides rea-
sonable efforts to the parents in an effort to promote reunification.
1. Abuse and Neglect
One court described abuse and neglect cases as "fact sensitive," "idio-
syncratic," and requiring "careful, individual scrutiny."'" The court went on
to state that "[i]n child abuse and neglect cases, [courts] recognize the need
to evaluate the totality of the proofs because the evidence can be synergisti-
cally related."'0 3 Typically, when a state intervenes to protect an abused or
neglected child under the age of eighteen, the conduct precipitating removal
will include the following:
"a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or
guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care (a) in supplying
the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical or surgical care
though financially able to do so or though offered financial or other reasonable
means to do so, or (b) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardian-
ship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk
thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other
acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court."' 4
100. See. e.g., O'Brien, supra note 8, at 1224 n.88 (1994) (analyzing the impact of
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)). For an updated discussion of the need
for court-appointed attorneys to represent children in dependency hearings, see Barbara Ann
Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search for Clear and Workable Standards, 19
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 183 (2005).
101. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
102. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 11 A.3d 844,853 (N.J. 2011).
103. Id. at 857.
104. Id. at 852 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21(c)(4) (West 2012)).
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Often, a state removes a child from a parent's custody, thereby making
the child dependent because of overt abuse such as beating, shaking, or
burning a child.' °5 Sometimes the abuse is psychological, as when a parent
coaches a child to lie about the other parent's fictitious abuse, thereby caus-
ing the child psychological harm and a continuing risk of harm." Some-
times the cause of a child's dependency is neglect. Illustrative is one case
where a mother did not take her child for a "recommended follow-up blood
screening to determine if [the child] had sickle cell disease or merely the
trait," and the court held that the mother was guilty of medical neglect." 7 In
many cases the parent is mentally unable to care for the child; the parent's
rights are then terminated because of the dire future prospects for the child.
One court stated that the
[p]rognostic evidence must show that the parent is presently unable to supply phys-
ical and emotional care for the child, with the aid of available social agencies if
necessary, and that this inability of a parent will continue for time enough to render
improbable the successful assimilation of the child into a family if the parent's
rights are not terminated.1
08
2. Poverty
The majority of children declared dependent are victims of neglect."°
These families are typically poor."0 Poverty may precipitate conditions that
can then be defined as neglect. Often too, when children are removed and
reasonable efforts provided, the parents may be unable to respond to the
105. Often parents justify abusive treatment as an exercise of parental discipline, but
a parent must use reasonable force to discipline a child or it constitutes abuse. See, e.g., Si-
mons v. State, Dep't of Human Servs., 803 N.W.2d 587, 590 (N.D. 2011) (holding that a
father's beating of a two-year-old with a wooden back scratcher was child abuse and not
parental discipline).
106. See In re M.A., 60 A.3d 732 (Vt. 2012). But see In re Drake M., 149 Cal. Rptr.
3d 875 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding that a nine-month-old boy was not endangered by his fa-
ther's use of medical marijuana three or four times a week); State v. Orquiz, 284 P.3d 418
(N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (convicting the father of child abuse by endangerment when the fa-
ther's nine-year-old son was riding in a car that the father crashed into a ditch while driving
intoxicated).
107. See In re Erin A., 976 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (I11. App. Ct. 2012).
108. In re J.A.L., 432 N.W.2d 876, 878 (N.D. 1988) (holding that only continuous
foster care for mother and child would suffice where the child was diagnosed with cerebral
palsy and the services provided were ineffective); In re M.R.R., 807 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2011) (holding that a child is only dependent when "parent[s] [are] unwilling or unable
to provide" necessary medical treatment); see also In re C.W., No. C-1 10342, 2011 WL
4375334, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2011) (holding that neither the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, nor its related regulations, provide that a violation of the ADA or its
regulations by a public entity may be used as a defense against a legal action by that public
entity).
109. Bailie, supra note 12, at 2294.
110. Id. ("[F]amilies involved in neglect proceedings are overwhelmingly poor.").
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reasonable efforts because of the consequences of poverty, the reason why
their children were declared dependent initially. Their poverty creates a
vicious cycle. As one study shows, "[t]he most recent data gathered during
the 2010 census indicated that between 2008 and 2009, with the onset of the
current recession, the number of children living below federal poverty
standards in the United States increased from 18 percent to almost 21 per-
cent, representing approximately 1.5 million children."''. Estimates show
that by 2009, one year after the start of what may be described as one of the
worst economic downturns in generations, the number of children living in
poverty "rose dramatically to 15.5 million children (or one in five children
in the United States)."'" 2 Furthermore, in 2009, "700,000 children spent at
least some time in foster care. 255,418 entered care while an additional
276,266 left or exited foster care. Of the 276,266 children that left foster
care, 140,061 or 51 percent were reunified with a parent or primary caretak-
er." 3 But this data also indicates a significant number were either emanci-
pated or adopted."
4
One commentator describes the syndrome occasioned by childhood
poverty as the following:
"Poverty is linked with poor nutrition, lack of medical care, inadequate daycare,
poor educational facilities, and psychological feelings of helplessness and stress.
Any one of these conditions could support an allegation of specific harm." Because
the definition of neglect encompasses many circumstances that are a direct result of
111. Bruce A. Boyer & Amy E. Halbrook, Advocating for Children in Care in a
Climate of Economic Recession: The Relationship Between Poverty and Child Maltreatment,
6 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 300, 305 (2011). The president of First Focus, a bipartisan advoca-
cy organization dedicated to making children and families a priority in federal policy and
budget decisions, writes that "[n]early one in four children lives in poverty, nearly the same
fraction are hungry or at risk of hunger, and 1.3 million students drop out of school every
year." FIRST Focus, CHILDREN'S BUDGET 2012, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 CHILDREN'S
BUDGET], available at http:l/www.firstfocus.net/sites/defaultlfileslCB2012%2OFinal-
Web.pdf.
112. KATHERINE SELL ET AL., FIRST Focus, THE EFFECT OF THE RECESSION ON CHILD
WELL-BEING: A SYNTHESIS OF THE EVIDENCE BY POLICYLAB, THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF
PHILADELPHIA 3 (2010), available at
http://www.firstfocus.netlsites/default/files/RecessionChildWellBeing.pdf. The Urban Insti-
tute and the Brookings Institution report that in 2010 "forty-four percent of children were
living in families with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty level-up from 42 percent
in 2009." TRACY VERICKER ET AL., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., How TARGETED ARE
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN?: A KIDS' SHARE ANALYSIS OF EXPENDITURES BY
INCOME IN 2009, at v (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412522-How-
Targeted-Are-Federal-Expenditures-on-Children.pdf.
113. AM. HUMANE ASS'N, REUNIFICATION SERVICES AND FEDERAL FUNDING 1 (2011)
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poverty, child welfare agencies may have no choice but to intervene in poor fami-
lies' lives."
5
State courts often refer to particular obstacles to reunification of the
family, almost all associated with poverty. Among them are: "lack of finan-
cial resources, lack of stable housing or employment, . . . drug or alcohol
dependency," incarceration, and an inability to visit with children and keep
scheduled appointments with counselors." 6
3. Process
Whenever a child is declared to be dependent, a process begins that is
similar in scope among the various states." 7 Unless a child is surrendered by
a parent to a state agency, child-protection proceedings start with a report of
suspected child abuse or neglect." 8 The report initiates an investigation of
the allegations made by the state child protective services." 9 If the agency
finds that a child is in danger, the agency will recommend services that will
allow the child to remain within the home. 2° If the agency finds that the
services will be inadequate, then the child will be removed from the home
and placed in kinship care or foster care.'2' Upon removal, "the child protec-
tive [services] will file a petition [in] family court reporting the facts sur-
rounding the parent's alleged neglect or abuse."'22 There will then be a fact-
finding hearing, at which the child, the parent, and the state may be repre-
sented by attorneys.'23 The court must determine if there is clear and con-
vincing evidence to deprive the parent of the child; only a preponderance of
the evidence is necessary to remove a child, but a hearing must be held
within a reasonable amount of time to afford the parent due process.'24
If the court decides at a subsequent hearing that there is sufficient
clear and convincing evidence to keep the child in dependency, then, in
115. Bailie, supra note 12, at 2296 (quoting Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When
Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for Poverty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447,
461 (1997)).
116. See Bean, supra note 71, at 348-49 (discussing these factors).
117. See Bailie, supra note 12, at 2298-302.
118. Id. at 2298.
119. Id. at 2298-99.
120. Id. at 2299.
121. The 2012 federal budget allocates "$80 million for the Guardianship Assistance
program, a state optional program enacted as part of the Fostering Connections to Success
Act." 2012 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 8. Kinship care is similar to foster care in
that payments are based on a "child['s] eligibility ... to the AFDC July 16, 1996 income
eligibility standard"; under kinship care a child is placed with a family member pending
reunification efforts. Id.
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most situations, it is the responsibility of the parent to work with reasonable
efforts offered by the state to correct the adverse conditions at home.125 If
the court determines that reasonable efforts at reunification are not neces-
sary because of aggravated circumstances, then the court may proceed to
terminate the parent's rights to custody of the child. 26 Assuming, however,
that evidence presented at the hearing justifies reasonable reunification ef-
forts, the state will establish a family services plan and the parent must visit
with the child and complete the requirements of the plan. One commentator
maintains that "[t]he parent's active participation in this process and fre-
quent visitation with [the] child are crucial to [the] child's expedient return
home."'27 If the parent does not cooperate with the reasonable efforts made
to reunify the parent, and the child remains within foster care for fifteen of
the next twenty-two months, the state may petition to terminate the parent's
right to custody of his or her child.
2 8
Although the process just described varies among the states, this de-
scription provides an insight into what occurs when a child is involuntarily
removed from a parent's custody. Assuming that reasonable efforts are
mandated, and hence there were no aggravating circumstances, the goal is to
keep the child in the parental household and to provide services to rectify
problems. If the child is removed and placed in kinship care, time deadlines
occasioned by federal legislation are held in abeyance. But if a child is
placed in foster care, the parent's immediate cooperation with reasonable
125. Id. at 2301-02.
126. See, e.g., In re Ashley S., 762 A.2d 941, 945 (Me. 2000), overruled by In re
B.C., 58 A.3d 1118 (Me. 2012) (interpreting the provisions of 22 ME REV. STAT. §
4041(2)(A)(1) (Supp. 2000) and holding that "if the court finds the existence of an 'aggravat-
ing factor,' ... is inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, or if two placements of
the child with the same parent have failed, the Department may be relieved of its reunifica-
tion responsibilities"). Some courts have provided reasonable reunification services even
though aggravating circumstances existed and would have precluded the necessity. See, e.g.,
People ex. rel. D.B., 670 N.W.2d 67, 72 (S.D. 2003).
127. Bailie, supra note 12, at 2301-02. See, e.g., In re Gabriel K., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d
813 (Ct. App. 2012) (terminating the mother's rights when the mother failed to attend drug
rehabilitation programs, "did not comply with the elements of her case plan, and failed to
apprise caseworkers of her whereabouts"); In re Valencia Katina H., 501 N.Y.S.2d 887
(App. Div. 1986) (holding that termination of parental rights could occur when the parent
failed to visit with his children and failed to keep child protective services aware of his loca-
tion for more than six months).
128. See, e.g., In re K.M.O., 2012 WY 99, 280 P.3d 1203, 1210-11 (Wyo. 2012)
(holding that the children residing in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two
months was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to satisfy the first element in terminat-
ing parental rights). Some states have even shorter deadlines than the Federal Act. See Doro-
thy Roberts, ASFA: An Assault on Family Preservation, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercre/insider, as excerpted from
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) ("In Nevada,
for example, a parent's failure to comply with the terms of the reunification plan within six
months can trigger a hearing on termination of parental rights.").
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efforts is essential to prevent termination of parental rights. If the efforts are
not reasonably related to the individual circumstances precipitating the de-
pendency, then any reasonable efforts provided serve only as a shibboleth.
B. Reasonable Efforts
The ASFA specifies that
reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families [under two cir-
cumstances: first,] prior to the placement of the child in foster care [so as] to pre-
vent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child's home; and [se-
cond,] to make it possible for [the] child to safely return to the ... home
if removal becomes necessary. 9 Timing is essential. The ASFA specifies
that if a child is placed in foster care, then there must be a permanency plan
hearing for the child within twelve months and every twelve months after-
wards; 3 ° but initially, reasonable efforts must be offered within sixty days
of the child's removal.' Throughout this process, the state must provide
adequate reasonable efforts because the parents' cooperation or noncoopera-
tion will provide the clear and convincing evidence permitting any termina-
tion of parental rights. 3 The goal for the families affected, the states, and
for the courts is to "offer services that fit together as a package and accom-
modate a parent's other obligations, including work."' 33
129. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006). No reasonable efforts are required if a court
holds that there exist aggravating circumstances permitting termination of parental rights. Id.
§ 671 (a)(1 5)(D).
130. Id. § 675(5)(C)(i). If a court determines that reasonable services are not to be
made, then a permanency hearing must be held within thirty days. The permanency plan
involves consideration of reunification, legal guardianship, or kinship care with a fit and
willing relative. The plan is a case-specific judicial determination, and it must be made with-
in twelve months of the entry of the child into foster care, which is either the time there is a
factual determination of abuse or neglect or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the
child from the home. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21 (b)(2), (d) (2007). If a reasonable efforts de-
termination is not made on a timely basis, the child remains ineligible for federal Title IV-E
foster care funding until the first of the month such a judicial determination is made. id. §
1356.21 (b)(2).
131. Id. § 1356.21(b)(1), (d). If the sixty-day deadline is not met, the child loses
eligibility for Title IV-E funding for the foster care. Id. § 1356.21(c) (stating that failure to
make a timely and adequate finding of reasonable efforts where a child is removed by a court
results in the loss of federal Title IV-E funding for the duration of the foster care placement).
132. § 675(5)(E)(iii) ("[T]he State has not provided to the family of the child, con-
sistent with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary
for the safe return of the child to the child's home, if reasonable efforts of the type described
in section 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) of this title are required to be made with respect to the child.").
133. LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., OR. CHILD ADVOCACY PROJECT, REASONABLE EFFORTS
TO REUNIFY IN DEPENDENCY CASES 1 (2009), available at
http://familylaw.uoregon.edu/files/2011/I 2/reasonableeffortsmemo.pdf.
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Reasonable efforts sufficient to reunite parent and child are factually
determinative,134 and "[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the
importance of reunification [services] in the dependency system.' ' 35 There
is a lack of a concise definition in the federal statutes or in judicial opinions
as to reasonable services, but a few state statutes offer suggestions. Oregon,
for example, states that the efforts to reunify the family must bear a rational
relationship to the jurisdictional findings that brought the ward within the
court's jurisdiction. 136 And to ensure for effective planning for wards, the
Oregon Department of Human Services shall include in the case plan
"[a]ppropriate services to allow the parent the opportunity to adjust the par-
ent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it possible for the ward
to safely return home within a reasonable time."'37 And the Department of
Human Services has an obligation to make "active efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the ward from the home" and to make
"reasonable or active efforts to make it possible for the ward to safely return
134. Reasonable efforts to provide services "means an earnest and conscientious
effort to take good faith steps to provide those services, taking into consideration the charac-
teristics of the parent or child, the level of cooperation of the parent, and other relevant cir-
cumstances of the case." In re Elijah W.L., 785 N.W.2d 369, 383 (Wis. 2010). See also In re
Ronell A., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474 (Ct. App. 1996) (judging reasonableness of services on con-
tent and implementation). Key elements of any reunification effort have been suggested to be
the following: (1) an agency priority of reunification; (2) a "systemwide effort[] to recognize
and address the disproportionate representation of children of color in the child welfare sys-
tem"; (3) "active collaboration with the courts in working toward timely [and] stable reunifi-
cation"; (4) "collaboration with related agencies ... [to address] financial need, substance
abuse, mental health, and domestic violence" issues; (5) "broad-based community-
partnership[s]"; (6) strategies for achieving timely and stable reunification; (7) "policies and
standards that clearly define expectations, identify requirements, and reinforce casework
practices that support reunification"; (8) adequately "train[] supervisors who [then] explain
agency policies that support safe and timely reunification, offer coaching to caseworkers, and
provide support and feedback"; (9) assign manageable caseloads to caseworkers so that they
can engage families; (10) make available "diverse out-of-home and post-reunification ser-
vices that can respond specifically to the family's identified needs and conditions"; (11)
maintain a "data system[] that monitor[s] and measure[s] ... case-level data on timeliness of
reunification and reentry into foster care"; and (12) obtain "external assistance in the form of
training, consultation, and technical assistance from recognized experts." CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUPPORTING REUNIFICATION AND
PREVENTING REENTRY INTO Outr-oF-HOME CARE (2012), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issuebriefs/srpr.pdf.
135. In re Luke L., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Elizabeth R., 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 200 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Family preservation, with the attendant reunification plan and
reunification services, is the first priority when child dependency proceedings are com-
menced.").
136. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.343(l)(a) (West 2013); see also Family Support
and Related Services, WASH. DEP'T Soc. & HEALTH SERV.,
http://www.dshs.wa.gov/ca/about/srv-iontro.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (providing a
service array for Washington, along with the projected implementation timeline).
137. § 419B.343(2)(a).
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home."' 38 The services aimed at reunification must go beyond mere matter
of form and include real, genuine assistance.'39
1. Parameters of Efforts
One case is illustrative of the extent and use of services, or what the
statute terms "reasonable efforts.""' ° The decision is In re K.L.J. and
T.L.J.'4 ' The facts in K.L.J. involved a mother's twins, her sixth and seventh
children. 4 ' The mother's rights to four of her previous children were termi-
nated; another child born to her died while in her custody.'43 Because of the
mother's history, the twins were removed from the mother's custody within
days of their birth, and, based on the mother's history, child protective ser-
vices sought to waive the requirement to provide reasonable efforts to pro-
mote reunification.'" Because there were aggravated circumstances, a factor
listed in the ASFA, the court ruled that reasonable efforts could be
waived.'45 Nonetheless, the court ordered that services-reasonable ef-
forts-be provided to the mother because if she had additional children this
may benefit them.'46 The services offered to the mother were the following:
From 2000 through 2007, DHS offered or provided a wide array of services to the
mother, including: DHS case management; Department of Correctional Services
probation supervision; United Action for Youth Teen Parenting Program; House of
Mercy residential program for mothers and children; Families, Inc. services; Visit-
ing Nurse Association visitation supervision; parenting instruction; supervised vis-
itation; budgeting assistance; protective day care; Family Team Meetings; mental
health evaluation; individual therapy; substance abuse evaluation, treatment, and
drug testing; domestic violence counseling, shelter, and support; paternity testing;
foster family care. In addition, DHS made referrals and/or assisted her with appli-
cations for a number of services through federal, state and/or local agencies, in-
cluding: Women's Resource and Action Center; Domestic Violence Intervention
138. Id. § 419B.340(l); see also State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Jackson Cnty v. K.D.,
209 P.3d 810 (Or. App. 2009) (holding that state DHS is obliged to undertake reasonable
efforts to make it possible for the ward to safely return home based on the circumstances
existing during the period prior to the permanency hearing and that period must be sufficient
in length to afford a good opportunity to assess parental progress).
139. See, e.g., In re Children of L.V., Nos. A04-1807, A04-1827, 2005 WL 704225,
at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005).
140. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §
101(a)(1), 94 Stat. 500 (2006); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 671 (a)(] 5)(B)(ii) (2006).
141. In re. K.L.J. & T.L.J., No. 2-753/12-1102, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. filed Sept. 6,
2012), available at http://statecasefiles.justia.com/documents/iowa/court-of-appeals/2-753-
12-1102.pdfts=1 346943877.
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Program; Community Mental Health Center; Grant Wood Area Education Authori-
ty; Title XIX medical care; Family Investment Program financial subsidies; food
stamps; HACAP Housing Program; HACAP Head Start; Iowa City Housing Au-
thority Family Unity Program ("FUP") referral; and Section 8 housing.
1 47
In spite of the extensive array of state services offered to the mother,
all of which were reasonably calculated to address the causes that precipi-
tated the removal of her children, her parental rights to her twins were ter-
minated.1 48 The court held that there was clear and convincing proof that the
mother had not made any significant improvement in her ability to regain
custody of the children. 49 The court's holding terminating parental rights
illustrates that compliance with reasonable services by a parent is linked to
reunification with any child involuntarily removed from the parent's custo-
dy.1
50
2. Refusal to Cooperate
Most often the reason for the termination of parental rights is the par-
ent's refusal to adequately cooperate with the services provided. Courts
have argued that a "relevant consideration in determining 'reasonable ef-
147. Id. at *4-5. Professor Bean lists the array of services that most states offer.
Among them are: "drug treatment, housing assistance, homemaker services, counseling,
transportation, parenting education, anger management classes, mental health care, child-
development classes, home visits by nurses, day care, referrals to medical care, domestic
violence counseling, financial management services, alcohol recovery support, stress man-
agement services, nutritional guidance, and arrangements for visitation" with children. Bean,
supra note 71, at 345-46 (footnotes omitted); see also In re Jonathan T., 148 A.2d 82, 88
(N.H. 2002). Services in In re Jonathan T. included:
school-based and outpatient services to the family, including parent aide services,
preschool and day care, parenting and stress management classes, therapy and
counseling, supervised visitations, financial management assistance and nutritional
guidance. In some cases, these services exceeded normal protocol. For example, at
one point the parent aide was visiting the family's home every day, well above the
one-visit-per-month guideline .... [The agency] also made additional efforts by
holding pre-visitation meetings with the respondents to discuss the previous visita-
tion as well as concerns, suggestions and planning issues.
Id.
148. In re K.L.J. & T.L.J., No. 2-753/12-1102, at *2-3.
149. Id. at *5. The court reported that the mother's situation had further deteriorated
since reasonable efforts were provided. Id. at *5-6 ("She lost her job. She was evicted due to
non-payment of rent and there is a $1200 claim pending against her. She is again living with
her sister, . . . with whom she has had a [convulsive] relationship over the years .... She has
not been regularly attending mental health counseling as recommended in her psychological
evaluation. She has not even scheduled the neuropsychological evaluation that was recom-
mended. She has not been following through with domestic violence services .... She con-
tinues to drive without a valid license, putting herself at risk of arrest.").
150. See, e.g., Katie V. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 320, 329-330 (Ct. App.
2005).
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fort[s]' to provide services is the parents' 'level of cooperation.""''  State
statutes permit termination of parental rights upon a showing that the parent
clearly and convincingly did not cooperate with services offered. One Con-
necticut decision applied its state's statute in a typical holding:
One of the four predicates for the termination of parental rights under [the state
statute] covers the situation in which, over an extended period of time, "the parent
of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or un-
cared for in a prior proceeding has failed to achieve such a degree of personal re-
habilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, consider-
ing the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position
in the life of the child."'
152
One court summarized the effect of a parent's refusal to cooperate
with services by finding that there was "more than adequate evidence of the
agency's performance in these regards, particularly in its repeated efforts to
inform [the parent] of the vital necessity of her accepting counseling ser-
vices."'53 The court went on to point out that "[t]he agency devised reunifi-
cation plans, arranged and facilitated visits, and provided transportation for
those visits even though [the parent] often had access to public transporta-
tion."'54 The parent's rights to the child were terminated because the parent
did not cooperate with reasonable efforts provided to address the specific
cause of the removal of the child.15 Even though the parent obtained a job
and a better apartment, the failure to cooperate with the specific services
offered resulted in termination of parental rights.'56
While states must provide reasonable services to promote reunifica-
tion, the services offered do not have to continue for the time initially con-
templated. 7 Furthermore, the state may terminate reasonable efforts pro-
vided to one parent and continue providing them to the other parent.'58 Illus-
trative of this duality is a case involving parents of a five-year-old girl.'59
The child was removed from the custody of the parents and her "maternal
grandmother acquired temporary guardianship.""' Eventually, the daughter
151. In re Elijah W.L., 785 N.W.2d 369, 386 (Wis. 2010) (quoting WIs. STAT. §
48.415(2)(a)2.a. (2013)); see also In re T.G., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 412-15 (Ct. App. 2010)
(finding that the parent must keep the social worker informed as to that parent's wherea-
bouts); In re William G., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 439 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a parent
must appear in court even though the parent was fearful of an outstanding warrant).
152. In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873, 883 (Conn. 1999) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. §
17a-1 12(j)(3)(E) (2013)).
153. In re Kathaleen, 460 A.2d 12, 14 (R.I. 1983).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 15.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., In re Aryanna C., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288, 289 (Ct. App. 2005).
158. See, e.g., In re Jesse W., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 435, 439-40 (Ct. App. 2007).
159. In re Katelynn Y., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 426 (Ct. App. 2012).
160. Id.
1057
Michigan State Law Review
was placed with the paternal grandparents.16' Both of the parents "have a
history of methamphetamine use and domestic violence."'' 12 Additionally,
when a therapist treated the daughter, it was revealed that her parents had
sexually abused her.'63 The daughter also witnessed her mother and a male
other than her father having sex."6 Child protective services alleged that the
girl suffered from "severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal and outwardly
aggressive behavior toward herself and others."'65
After ordering that the parents receive reasonable services to promote
rehabilitation, to include "parenting education [and] counseling with a ther-
apist specializing in sexual abuse and substance abuse treatment," the moth-
er "did not participate in services" offered.'66 The father was incarcerated
and initially cooperated with the services offered for three months, but then
stopped attending sessions when he was released from prison.'67 After a
short time, he then began to avail himself of the services again and was co-
operating with state efforts when the state refused services to the mother.'68
The court, upon review, held that:
"[b]ecause reunification services are a benefit, not a constitutional entitlement, the
juvenile court has discretion to terminate those services at any time, depending on
the circumstances presented .... In deciding whether to terminate the services of
one parent who has failed to participate or make progress toward reunification, the
court is not constrained by a consideration of the other parent's participation in
services."169
3. Unreasonable Efforts
There is another aspect of reasonable efforts: What happens when they
are offered to parents and because of cooperation the child is returned to the
family home only to be removed again because of parental regression into
harmful conduct? When the child returns to a dependency status, this is re-
ferred to as reentry. In a report prepared by the Wisconsin Department of









169. Id. at 428 (quoting In re Jesse W., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 435, 440 (Ct. App. 2007)).
See also In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873, 886 (Conn. 1999) ("Proof of reasonable reunification
efforts is not a constitutionally mandated prerequisite to granting a petition for the termina-
tion of parental rights. The constitutional requirement of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence applies only to those findings upon which the ultimate decision to terminate parental
rights is predicated.").
1058 2013:1029
Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification
[c]urrently, case management and other support services for the child and family
cease fairly abruptly at the point of reunification. At the time of reunification a
family is relatively strong, having just concluded a period of tailored support ser-
vices. Clinical experience in Wisconsin indicates that often, however, the family
has not yet developed the capacity to successfully and safely manage the periodic
and unexpected life stresses which arise over the subsequent months. The family
has no supports from the child welfare system to assist in handing those post-
reunification stresses effectively.' 
70
Most often, the family's lack of preparedness results in the child's reentry
into protective out-of-home care. This reentry often has a range of negative
impacts on the safety and general well-being of the child. Furthermore,
"[r]e-entry into out-of-home care subjects the child to the trauma of recur-
rence of maltreatment or neglect which precipitates a child's re-entry into
out-of-home care and another separation from his/her parent or relative
caregiver."' 71 One academic states that "[s]cientific research has shown that
trauma experienced in childhood creates a 'toxic stress' that leads to imme-
diate and lifelong impairments in behavior, cognitive development and
learning, and mental and physical health.' 72 It is further argued that "chil-
dren in out-of-home care tend to have poorer social, emotional, educational,
and health outcomes than their peers, due to disruptions in school and/or
child care settings, loss of close connections to family and friends, and other
factors."'73
Admittedly, states often fail to meet the reasonable efforts mandate.
For example, state services offered were unreasonable when reunification
depended on the father finding his way to his own home but child protective
services did nothing to assist.'74 Likewise, a state failed when a sixty-day
trial visit with the parent was indefinitely delayed by the state agency even
170. FREDI-ELLEN BOVE, Wis. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, WISCONSIN'S
FEDERAL TITLE IV-E DEMONSTRATION REQUEST: PROMOTING CHILD PERMANENCY AND
WELL-BEING 5 (2012), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs-fund/wi-waiver.proposal.pdf. Wisconsin
reports that from March 2011 to April 2012, "20.1% of children who were in out-of-home
care in Wisconsin re-entered the child welfare out-of-home care system within twelve
months of their discharge from out-of-home care." Id. at 6. "Wisconsin has the 5th highest
re-entry rate of all states." Id. Proposals to reverse reentry include a demonstration project
that proposes: (1) a foster care medical home, (2) Early Childhood Care and Education, (3)
Early Head Start, (4) YoungStar, (5) Kindergarten Early Assessment, (6) K-12 educational
data exchange, (7) collaboration with the court system, (8) Protective Capacity Family As-
sessment Model, (9) Child and Adolescent Needs and Strengths Assessment, (10) parent peer




174. David B. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336, 354-58 (Ct. App. 2004).
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though the visits were deemed reasonable to bring about parent-child reuni-
fication.'75 Such failures prompt liability questions.
4. Liability of Service Providers
Federal law, § 1983, permits plaintiffs to sue state officials for the
deprivation of any right secured by federal law or the federal Constitution.'76
But the cause of action under § 1983 is limited to the following: (1) when
the statute creates specific, individual enforceable rights; or (2) when the
statute uses rights-creating language; and (3) when Congress has not pre-
cluded individual enforcement of that right.'77 Only an "unambiguously
conferred right [will] support a cause of action brought under § 1983."'' 7
Laws that impose generalized duties upon the state, but which do not man-
date individual outcomes, may create "interests" or "benefits," but they do
not create the kind of individualized "rights" that § 1983 protects.'79
Individual claimants do not have a federal right to enforce strict com-
pliance with a reasonable efforts mandate. In 1989, the Court in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services held that a parent had
no due process right to sue the government for its failure to protect a child
from the abuse of another private party-the other parent in this case." ° And
specifically, in reference to child-welfare law, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Suter v. Artist M. in 1992, which denied plaintiffs the right to use
§ 1983 to enforce the Child Welfare Act.'8' The cause of action in the Suter
decision had been brought on behalf of children against the director of the
Illinois child abuse and neglect agency, alleging that the agency failed to
comply with the "reasonable efforts" requirements of the AACWA of
1980."82 The facts involved a class of Illinois plaintiffs, including children
residing in Illinois's child protective services agency, arguing that "the state
175. Rita L. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 157, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2005).
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
177. Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004). But see
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987) (permitting
plaintiffs to sue under § 1983 to recover rent overcharges because the Public Housing Act
specifically provided for how the rent ceiling should be calculated).
178. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
179. Id.
180. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
181. 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992). Because Suter precludes private litigation to define
what constitutes "reasonable efforts," it compounds the deficiency created by Congress when
it failed to define reasonable efforts in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980. See Bean, supra note 71, at 324-26; Crossley, supra note 63, at 261-62 ("The federal
government's failure to provide guidance on the requirements needed to satisfy reasonable
efforts, along with the general shift away from preservation and reunification services, has
left states to decide how to define the rules and standards for making reasonable efforts.").
182. Suter, 503 U.S. at 352.
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failed to make reasonable efforts by failing to promptly appoint case man-
agers to children entering the CPS system and to promptly reassign children
to new case managers when necessary."'' 3 "The Suter Court did not reach
the issue of whether the state satisfied its agreement to make reasonable
efforts but instead held that individual private plaintiffs did not have a fed-
erally enforceable right to reasonable efforts. ' ' "M
Commentators have suggested that the decision in Suter did permit the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to enforce the reasonable efforts
provision of the Child Welfare Act with specific guidelines.'85 But regretta-
bly, the Secretary has failed to monitor each state's efforts.'86 Congress rati-
fied this approach, and in response to Suter, Congress enacted an amend-
ment to the Social Security Act in 1994. The amendment, applicable to the
effect of failure to carry out a state plan to adequately offer reasonable ser-
vices, provides for the following:
In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such provision is not to
be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter re-
quiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. This section
is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of
private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any
such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M ... but not applied in prior Supreme
Court decisions respecting such enforceability; provided, however, that this section
is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(15) of
this title is not enforceable in a private fight of action.'
87
If the Secretary does not monitor the state plans and if there is no pri-
vate cause of action to hold the state accountable (as a result of Suter and
183. Crossley, supra note 63, at 289.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 289-90.
186. Id. But see In re Rood, 763 N.W.2d 587, 598 (Mich. 2009) (holding that a parent
may challenge the state's failure to follow proper procedures when the state seeks to termi-
nate parental rights over a child).
187. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-2 (2011) (citation omitted). One commentator suggests that
subsequent congressional statutes, such as the Adoption and Safe Families Act, further min-
imize reasonable efforts. "This suggests that states view ASFA's clarification of reasonable
efforts primarily as legislation diluting the obligation to make reasonable efforts." Crossley,
supra note 63, at 294. Nonetheless, in 1994, amendments to the Social Security Act authorize
Health and Human Services to review state child and family programs to ensure conformity
with Titles IV-B and IV-E for federal funding. After March 25, 2000, states are reviewed for
substantial conformity with federal requirements for child protection, foster care, adoption,
family preservation and family support, and independent living services. The Children's
Bureau, part of United States Department Health and Human Services, administers the re-
views. See Children's Bureau, Monitoring, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/monitoring (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). An informative
memorandum was developed by the Children's Bureau on court-agency collaboration. In-
formation Memorandum, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 24, 2005),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cbflaws-policies/policy/im/2005/imO505.htm.
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Congress's statutory response) then there is no federal standard of what
constitutes reasonable services to be offered to the parent.' Critics argue
that "[b]oth actions represented missed opportunities to define, clarify, and
provide measurement indicia for reasonable efforts. Congress could have
resolved the Supreme Court's concern about the absence of guidance on
reasonable efforts by simply providing factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether a state had complied."' 89 Instead, as a result, the test of what is
reasonable depends solely on whether a court holds that what is offered and
what the parent rejects provide clear and convincing evidence to terminate
parental rights."9 In the alternative, courts may terminate parental rights
when it determines there are aggravated circumstances; this too is elusive.
Taken as a whole, what is reasonable may depend on a number of factors:
(1) whether the parents and the child are adequately represented by attor-
neys, even though an attorney is not required in a civil proceeding; (2)
whether the parents visit with the child; and (3) the age and placement of
the child. Shrinking state budgets harbor attendant concerns. One commen-
tator suggests that what a state may reasonably provide is often less than
what is contemplated:
"Caseworkers cannot keep up.... The heavy demand on child welfare agencies in
fact hinders the provision of services to protect and support families .... The prob-
lems become interchangeable, the serious ones indistinguishable from the minor
ones; and needs are generalized and defined according to what services are current-
ly available." Because underfunded, understaffed, and mismanaged child welfare
agencies are responsible for handling and evaluating families' problems, these
agencies cannot meet their mandates and families suffer in the process. Although
states must make "reasonable efforts" to keep families together, in practice child
welfare agencies make "efforts that are reasonable in relation to funding available,
but not in relation to caseworkers' knowledge of effective programming." Thus,
the reasonable efforts requirement, originally created to protect families, does not
achieve its purpose in practice. Furthermore, the clarification of this requirement
provided by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 is not likely to encourage
agencies to make greater efforts to help families. Accordingly, indigent parents are
in great need of trained, competent, and able advocates to help them obtain the ser-
vices they require.'
9 1
188. See Crossley, supra note 63, at 263 (arguing that "the policies and actions of the
federal government have made the reasonable efforts clause a hollow requirement and rec-
ommends that federal authorities or individual states act to provide context for understanding
the reasonable efforts standard").
189. Id. at 290.
190. Some states sought to provide courts with greater clarity as to what constitutes
reasonable efforts. See, e.g., id. at 293-312 (analyzing state legislative and judicial formula-
tions of what constitutes reasonable state efforts).
191. ,a2:., supra note 12, at 2320 (citations omitted).
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C. Budgetary Constraints
Recessionary periods and the less available state revenues that accom-
pany them have always been factors in defining what constitutes reasonable
services offered to families in need. While the recession that began in 2008
and which has continued for a significant time afterwards is not the first
time states experienced budget constraints, it occasioned significant short-
falls in state budgets. One report notes that "since the start of the recent re-
cession, critical social services have been cut in at least 46 states.' 92
Commentators are quick to correlate curtailed state resources and con-
comitantly the ability of state agencies to provide adequate reasonable ser-
vices. One such commentator argued that "[a]cross the country, child pro-
tection and other human services agencies are facing budget shortages that
have caused funding freezes and service cuts."'93 Another recent article ob-
served that "once children are taken into care, they become wards of child-
welfare agencies that also face financial challenges, including budget cuts
and funding freezes that may lessen their capacity to ensure that children
taken away from their families can thrive and achieve permanency."' 94 Few-
er dollars compel state agencies to make decisions as to who will most like-
ly benefit from dollars spent on services. "In an era of dwindling resources,
the state may reasonably focus its reunification efforts on those families
most likely to be reconciled."'95 And judges are not immune from financial
constraints: "Judges may allow for lapses in following federal reasonable
efforts requirements so that agencies may conserve their resources."' 96 Allo-
cation of scarce resources prompts the question of which families are most
likely to be reunified.
Although the statutory framework that gives structure and purpose to the child wel-
fare system gives clear priority to natural families and reunifications, rates of reu-
nification have declined during the 1990s. The simple fact is, over the past 20
years, little progress has been made in defining and implementing meaningful reu-
nification programs.' 
97
192. SELL ET AL., supra note 112, at 32.
193. Boyer & Halbrook, supra note 111, at 307 (citing Erik Eckholm, States Slashing
Social Programs for Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at AI).
194. Id. at 304, 307 (adding that "research indicates that children of color receive
fewer supportive services than their white peers, stay in the system longer, are less likely to
be reunited with their families, and take longer to be adopted").
195. In re Gabriel K., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 819 (Ct. App. 2012).
196. Bean, supra note 71, at 334. Professor Bean adds: "Usually, the recognition that
resources are relevant is simply implicit in court opinions; occasionally, there is an explicit
comment. The implicit recognition is most often reflected in the courts' references to availa-
ble services." Id. at 365.
197. Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, FUITJRE. CHILD., Winter 2004, at 95, 110.
Some commentators suggest that successful reunification programs include the following: (1)
"meaningful family engagement"; (2) "[i]ndividualized needs assessment and clear, mutually
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1. Endangered Services
Particular services seem most impacted by budget cuts. For example,
among the services curtailed is the "the availability of contract-based thera-
peutic services, which include evaluations that are critical to understanding
the nature of a family's circumstances, and therefore essential to the devel-
opment of an effective plan for the reunification of children and their par-
ents." ' Also, attorneys serving as GALs complained that payments were
often six months late, there was a high turnover in therapists, long waits for
beds in in-patient drug-treatment programs, lack of transportation services,
and an inability to provide bus passes to parents seeking to visit with their
children across town. 199
Judicial decisions imply that what is reasonable bears a relationship to
what is available. These decisions support the nexus between the reasona-
bleness of services and available state resources: "the State must put forth
reasonable efforts given its available staff and financial resources to main-
tain the legal bond between parent and child."'' This prompts one commen-
tator to write, "when [the ASFA's] emphasis on the safety of the child com-
bines with limited state budgets, courts may be pressed to find reunification
efforts reasonable when they would otherwise be inadequate." '' And while
courts may order the appointment of counsel to assist parents in civil de-
pendency matters on a case-by-case basis, the legislature must compare the
costs versus benefits of providing and paying for counsel in abuse and ne-
glect cases against a vast array of other programs and interests ...while
also making judgments as to what level of resources the public can reasona-
bly be called upon to provide through taxation.2"
Utilizing aggravated circumstances-the exception to mandated rea-
sonable services-may be more attractive when there are fewer state and
county dollars to pay for services. Illustrative is a Maine decision that oc-
curred prior to the current recession. 3 The family consisted of a single
mother and eight children. The mother suffered from a "severe personality
established goals"; and (3) "[c]ognitive-behavioral, multi-systemic, skills-focused services."
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FAMILY
REUNIFICATION: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SHows 2 (2011), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue briefs/family-reunification/family-reunification.pd
f.
198. Boyer & Halbrook, supra note I 11, at 311.
199. Id. at311-12.
200. In re Shirley B., 18 A.3d 40, 55 (Md. 2011) (emphasis added). The court further
noted that "[tihe reasonableness of the Department's efforts to reunify parent with child
cannot be considered in a vacuum, but rather, must be evaluated against the backdrop of the
services available to it." Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
201. Bean, supra note 71, at 366 (footnote omitted).
202. In re C.M., 48 A.3d 942, 953 (N.H. 2012) (Lynn, J., concurring).
203. In re Heather C., 751 A.2d 448 (Me. 2000).
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disorder which interferes with her ability to understand the needs and ac-
tions of her children and to respond appropriately."' ' "° The mother had been
married to a man whom she later described "as a chronic alcoholic and who
'used her as a punching bag.""''0 Then, following a divorce from the first
man, she dated another man, but he also perpetrated domestic violence
against her. With a protection order still in place against the second man,
she married him while the order was still in place."° Soon afterwards, the
mother's parental rights were terminated because her children "suffered
from painful medical and dental neglect and had trouble walking correctly.
They had been kept in a cage-like enclosure, euphemistically referred to as a
crib, to control them, much like one would cage an animal and they exhibit-
ed many feral traits, including being totally uncontrollable.""2 7 When her
last child was born, the state declared the child a dependent child based on
the prior involuntary terminations and the mother's demonstrated inability
to take advantage of reasonable services. 08 The court concluded that this
was a proper exercise of its discretion.'
Instructive in this case is the court's assessment of how the state's fi-
nancial budget constraints may adversely impact reasonable services. The
mother argued that even though aggravated circumstances existed when her
last child was involuntarily removed and her rights eventually terminated,
her situation had improved." '° Because of this, there would be a "high risk
for erroneous deprivation of a parent's rights" if she were not offered rea-
sonable efforts to reunify her with her child."' In rejecting her argument, the
court incorporated concern over budgetary constraints: "The State ... has a
legitimate interest in making the best use of its limited resources .... If dif-
ficult decisions regarding allocation of scarce resources must be made, the
Legislature's determination that a prior involuntary termination is a factor to
be considered is both reasonable and legitimate."2 '2 Thus, reasonable ser-
vices may be offered less frequently when there are aggravated circum-
stances; refusal of services would conserve limited state resources.




208. Id. at 453-54.
209. Id. at 455.
210. Id. at453-54.
211. Id. at455.
212. Id. at 456. Prior involuntary termination of parental rights is a statutory aggra-
vating factor justifying a denial of additional services. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4002(1-
B)(C) (2012).
1065
Michigan State Law Review
2. Federal Disparity in Funding
Budgetary constraints and decreasing reasonable efforts are not hin-
dered by federal monitoring of what constitutes states' reasonable efforts to
reunify families. Professor Will L. Crossley, quoting Marcia Lowry, writes
that "[i]t is virtually impossible to fail [a Department of Health and Human
Services] audit."2 3 Professor Crossley describes the lax procedures that
some states follow in providing reasonable services, monitoring reasonable
services, and determining what constitutes reasonable services."1 4 Improve-
ments have been adopted," 5 but the states must contend with fewer state
resources to provide for reasonable efforts, and the federal resources go
primarily to foster care and adoption assistance,"6 not to assisting states
with funding an array of reasonable efforts to keep families together.
213. Crossley, supra note 63, at 282 (quoting Foster Care, Child Welfare, and Adop-
tion Reforms, Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Assistance & Unemployment
Compensation of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means and Select Comm. on Children, Youth, &
Families, 100th Cong. 20-21 (1988) (statement of Marcia Lowry, Director, Children's Rights
Project, ACLU)).
214. Crossley, supra note 63, at 284-86 (stating that states did not provide services
even though the file stated that they did or that the best interest of the child was satisfied but
without reference to any reasonable efforts to provide for reunification).
215. See, e.g., Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family Ser-
vices State Plan Reviews, 65 Fed. Reg. 4020 (Jan. 25, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.
1355, 1356, and 1357).
216. Pertinent federal programs and corresponding 2012 budgets are as follows:
(1) "The Abandoned Infants Assistance Program awards grants to public, non-
profit, and private organizations to provide services for infants and young
children, particularly those with AIDS, who remain hospitalized due to a lack
of appropriate out-of-home placement alternatives." 2012 CHILDREN'S
BUDGET, supra note I 11, at 19. The 2012 budget: $11.6 million, same as in
2008. Id.
(2) "Adoption Incentives Program provides incentive payments to states that in-
crease the number of adoptions of children in the public foster care system."
Id. at 20. The 2012 budget: $39.3 million, up from $4.3 million in 2008. Id.
(3) "Adoption Opportunities grants provide funds for projects designed to elimi-
nate barriers to adoption and help find permanent families for children who
would benefit from adoption, particularly children with special needs." Id.
The 2012 Budget: $39.2 million, up from $26.4 million in 2008. Id.
(4) "Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ... assist[s] states and communi-
ties in [finding] innovative and effective child abuse ... treatment services."
Id. at 21. The 2012 budget: $93.7 million, down from $95.4 million in 2008.
Id.
(5) Child Welfare Services State Grants may be used for services such as investi-
gation of child abuse and neglect, removal of children from unsafe homes, and
financial support for children in foster care. Id. The 2012 budget: $280.6 mil-
lion, down from $281.7 million in 2008. Id.
(6) "Child Welfare Services Training Grants provide fund[ing] to accredited pub-
lic or other nonprofit institutions of higher learning for specific projects to
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Because placing children in foster care will be subsidized by the fed-
eral funds if states follow the proper procedures, states can begin the de-
pendency process with little concern over state budgetary constraints. Thus,
if states provide inadequate reasonable efforts to precipitate reunification,
train prospective and current personnel for" child welfare work: $26.1 million,
up from $7 million in 2008. Id. at 22.
(7) "Community Services Block Grant Program offers funds to states to address
the causes of poverty by providing effective services in communities ... such
as child care, transportation, employment, education, and self-help projects":
$712.3 million, up from $653.8 million in 2008. Id.
(8) "Kinship Guardianship assistance payments are made on behalf of children
[paid] to grandparents and other relatives who have assumed legal guardian-
ship [over] children" under the terms of a state contract: $80 million, up from
$14 million in 2009, the first year of the program. Id. at 23.
(9) Adoption Assistance Paid to States assists states in developing "adoption as-
sistance agreements with parents who adopt children with a specific condition
or situation that prevents placements without further assistance from the
state": $2.4 billion, up from $2.2 billion in 2008. Id. at 24.
(10) Payment to States for Foster Care is the largest federal expenditure: $4.1 bil-
lion, down from $4.6 billion in 2008. Id.
(11) Promoting Safe and Stable Families Grants offer funds to states to "prevent
the unnecessary separation of children from their families, to improve the
quality of care and services to children and their families, and to promote fam-
ily reunification": $345 million for mandatory grants, the same as in 2008;
$63.1 million for discretionary grants, down from $63.3 million in 2008. Id. at
25.
(12) "Social Services Block Grant[s] offer[] funds to states to provide social ser-
vices that best [address] the needs of individuals in that state. Services typical-
ly include child day care, protective services for children and adults, and
home care services for the elderly and handicapped": $1.9 billion, up from
$1.7 billion in 2008. Id.
(13) Social Services Research and Demonstration Program promotes financial self-
sufficiency and greater social well-being of families and children: $5.8 mil-
lion, down from $21.2 million in 2008. Id. at 26.
(14) "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) ...assists struggling
families through direct cash payment[s], as well as work supports [such as]
job training and child care assistance." Id. at 125. The program "created in
1996 ... replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children." Id. The program
provides block grants to states receiving federal funds so that they may devel-
op and implement their own family assistance initiatives. Id. States must sup-
plement the federal contribution with state funds, and they are penalized if
they do not. Id. "States are required to spend over $12 billion a year in
Maintenance-of-Effort (MOE) funds to qualify for their share of the [federal
funds]." AHA REUNIFICATION AND FUNDING REPORT, supra note 113, at 4.
"Families may ... receive direct assistance for up to 60 months and states are
required to ensure that 50 percent of all families and 90 percent of two-parent
families receiving cash assistance meet specific work participation standards."
2012 CHILDREN'S BUDGET, supra note 11l, at 126. Nearly 4.5 million Ameri-
cans are helped by TANF, and 75% of them have been children. Id. But in
2012, TANF served less than 10% of all Americans living in poverty: $16.5
billion, down from $17.1 billion in 2008. Id. at 125-26.
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the child remains safe pending the expiration of the limit set by the ASFA.
If the parent fails to meet standards set by the state within that time frame,
then the parent's rights may be terminated, and federal funds are available
for adoption assistance for the child. Economically, the only significant cost
to the state is in providing for reasonable efforts, but "[flederal financial
reimbursement formulas made foster care placement more financially ad-
vantageous to states than providing preservation and reunification ser-
vices. '"217 Likewise, "federal funding formulas continue to restrict funding
for child welfare services while leaving foster care maintenance reimburse-
ments uncapped." ' 8 As one study showed, "[b]y 1999, foster care still ac-
counted for about seventy-three percent of all federal funding while the pro-
portion of funding for adoption activities rose to approximately fifteen per-
cent, but the proportion of funding covering child welfare services had fall-
en to only ten percent.
2 1 9
Even in 2012:
the use of [federal child welfare] funds is limited to support for foster care, subsi-
dized guardianship, and adoption services, as well as administrative costs and
caseworker training. In comparison, funding for prevention and reunification ser-
vices is primarily limited to the Child Welfare Services Program and the Promoting
Safe and Stable Families Program funds available under SSA Title IV-B-a rather
small pot in comparison to resources dedicated to foster care.22°
Specifically, 2012 federal budget allocations for non-foster care programs
consist of: (1) Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) fund-
217. Crossley, supra note 63, at 275-76. "Currently, the primary source of federal
dollars dedicated to child welfare services, Social Security Act Title IV-E, provides little
flexibility in the use of funds. Restrictions on this money mean a larger portion of federal
funding is dedicated to foster care, leaving less for prevention and family support services."
2012 CHILDREN'S BUDGET, supra note I 11, at 15.
218. Crossley, supra note 63, at 276.
219. Id. at 277.
220. 2012 CHILDREN'S BUDGET, supra note 111, at 15.
Title IV-E foster care and kinship-guardianship assistance requires that the income
of the family of the child ... meet the income eligibility requirement for Aid to
Families of Dependent Children (AFDC), based on the State AFDC standards that
were in place on July 16, 1996 during the month a petition was filed to remove the
child ... or [in] the month a Voluntary Placement Agreement is signed. The child
must have lived in the home of a specified relative within six months of the eligi-
bility month and be deprived of parental support. In addition, there must be a court
[determination holding that]: (1) [c]ontinuation in [the child's] home would be
contrary to the welfare of the child[,] and (2) reasonable efforts were made to pre-
vent the removal of the child from his [or] her [home, or (3) that reasonable efforts
had been made] to facilitate the return of the child who has [already] been re-
moved.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, FEDERAL FUNDING RESOURCES FOR CHILD WELFARE
(Apr. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/financingfunding.pdf.
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ing at $27 million allocated for state grants, 2' $29 million for discretionary
grants, and $42 million for Community Based Grants for the Prevention of
Child Abuse and Neglect;2 2 (2) Child Welfare Services funding at $282
million, and the state may use the money to address overall abuse and ne-
glect problems.223 States may also use these funds to provide services that
will keep families together and restore children to their parents or provide
for adoption if this is more appropriate.224 There is no federal income eligi-
bility criterion to receive these state services; 2 1 Social Services Block
Grants were allocated $1.7 billion, an amount that has remained the same
since 2000.226 These Social Service Block Grants enable the states to pro-
vide an array of twenty-nine services to children, youth, and families.227 In
2008, twenty-two states used $35 million to assist in the adoption of chil-
dren, and thirty-six states allocated $377 million for foster care services, but
only $142 million was used by thirty-two states for prevention and interven-
tion services in that same year.228 Additionally, $368 million has been reau-
thorized for the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program so as "to fund
four categories of service: family preservation, community-based family
support services, time-limited reunification services and adoption promotion
and support services. 229
Current 2012 and projected 2013 federal budgets indicate there may
be an innovation in child welfare. "Of the total budget for child welfare in
FY 2012, the expected outlay of $4.1 billion will support the foster care
program. ... ,12" But the 2013 budget includes a modest incentive program.
The program "provides an increase of $252 million in mandatory funds in
FY 2013 to support a reform agenda focused on providing incentives to
states to improve outcomes for children in foster care and those who are
221. 2012 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 3. There has been no increase in
funding of CAPTA since 2005. Id. States receive CAPTA grants to improve the state's Child
Protective Services system. Id. The Department of Health and Human Services is tasked with
addressing "best practices in differential response through dissemination of information,
research, [and] training of personnel." Id.
222. Id. The Community Based Grants seek to foster community programs designed
to strengthen and support families at the local level. Id. at 3-4. Organizations that would
benefit include family resource and support programs, "voluntary home visiting programs,
respite care programs, parenting education," and community activities that seek "to prevent




226. Id. at 6.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 7.
229. Id. at 4.
230. 2012 CHILDREN'S BUDGET, supra note 11l, at 15.
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receiving in-home services from the child welfare system. '23 1 Overall, the
program "could help states begin to address the unmet needs of children and
provide a range of services targeted to fostering resiliency and helping chil-
dren heal from the impacts of trauma and abuse. '232 But the incentives are
broad in scope, and it appears that they are "designed to reward states that
achieve improved outcomes for children in foster care and those at risk of
entering or re-entering foster care. 233
Increasing numbers of children in foster care led to enactment of the
AACWA of 1980 and the ASFA Act in 199 7 .M We are approaching the
same levels of children in foster care today.2 5 The 2012 federal budget allo-
cated $4.5 billion in Title IV-E Foster Care spending-$571 million more
than in 2011.236 Approximately 420,000 children are in foster care, and the
money that the states receive is spent on maintenance payments, administra-
tion costs, and maintaining a data system. 237 It follows that, as Fred Wulczyn
argues:
If a child is discharged from foster care, the basis for making a federal claim disap-
pears, along with the associated revenue .... [T]he harder child welfare service
providers try to reduce foster care utilization from current levels--either by lower-
ing admission rates (placement prevention), reducing time in care (earlier perma-
nency for children), utilizing less-restrictive settings, or lowering the rate of
231. Id.
232. Id. at 16.
233. 2012 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 2.
234. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, ADOPTION.COM,
http://encyclopedia.adoption.comlentry/Adoption-Assistance-and-Child-Welfare-Act-of-
1980/18/l.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton to Approve
Sweeping Shift in Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-adoption.html
(citing that in 1997 about a half million children were in foster care).
235. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AFCARS REPORT (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb (citing the number of children in foster care in
2012 at 399,546).
236. 2012 BUDGETANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 7. The goal remains, however, to find
the children permanent homes. See id. The Foster Care Maintenance Payments Program
assists states in caring for foster care children by funding the costs of providing for such
children, including food, clothes, and school supplies. See id. But the Adoption Assistance
Program provides financial assistance to states to promote adoption of hard-to-place children,
including children with special needs. Id. at 8. The 2012 federal budget allocates $2.5 billion
for the Adoption Assistance program to pay for payments to adoptive families, placement
costs, and the training of professionals and adoptive parents. Id. In addition, a similar pro-
gram, Adoption Incentive, has increased revenues in the 2012 federal budget: $39 million in
2010, $42 million in 2011, and $50 million in 2012. Id. These efforts have been successful.
Id. at 5. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of children adopted since the en-
actment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act and adoption financial incentives were pro-
vided. Id. "In 2009, 57,466 children were adopted from foster care." Id. The states receiving
the most money were Texas at $7.4 million, $5.7 million for Florida, $3.5 million for Michi-
gan, and $2.1 million for Pennsylvania. Id.
237. Id. at 7.
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reentry-the less federal revenue will be available to provide services, even if the
changes in service utilization are predicated on the judgments of professionals who
choose alternatives to foster care as a way to meet client needs.238
Foster care is a federally funded resource for states unable to meet
service demands. Eligibility to receive federal funds under the Title IV-E
program is reviewed under the Code of Federal Regulations. 239 Title IV
agencies will be reviewed in accordance with the following:
(1) The eligibility of the children on whose behalf the foster care maintenance
payments are made (section 472(a)(1)-(4) of the Act) to include:
(i) Judicial determinations regarding "reasonable efforts" and "contrary to
the welfare" in accordance with § 1356.21 (b) and (c),2 40 respectively;
(ii) Voluntary placement agreements in accordance with § 1356.22;
(iii) Responsibility for placement and care vested with the [Tlitle IV-E or
other public agency per section 472(a)(2)(B) of the Act;
(iv) Placement in a licensed foster family home or child care institution; and,
(v) Eligibility for AFDC under such State plan as it was in effect on July 16,
1996 per section 472(a)(3) or 479B(c)(1)(C)(ii)(II) of the Act, as appro-
priate.
(2) Allowable payments made to foster care providers who comport with sections
471(a)(10), 471(a)(20), 472(b) and (c), and 479B(c)(2) of the Act and §
1356.30.241
Each state with an approved plan may disburse foster care mainte-
nance payments on behalf of each child removed from the family home if
"(A) the removal and foster care placement met, and the placement contin-
ues to meet, the requirements of paragraph (2); and (B) the child, while in
the home, would have met the AFDC eligibility requirement[s] of [the
Code]. 242 And removal and foster care placement of the child are in accord-
238. Wulczyn, supra note 197, at 95, 108.
239. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.71 (2012).
240. The reasonable efforts requirement specifies: (1) the agency must first seek to
"maintain the family unit and prevent the unnecessary removal of [the] child from [the
child's] home"; (2) then to provide for "the safe reunification of the child and [the] family";
and (3) if unable to do either of the first two, then "to make and finalize alternate permanen-
cy plans in a timely manner." Id. § 1356.21 (b). Throughout, the health and safety of the child
"must be the paramount concern." Id. A judicial determination of whether reasonable efforts
were made or found to be unnecessary must be made within sixty days from the date the
child is removed from the home. Id. § 1356.21(b)(1)(i). And within twelve months of the
date the child is considered to have entered foster care, a "[T]itle IV-E agency must obtain a
judicial determination that it has made reasonable efforts to finalize [a] permanency plan" for
each child. Id. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i). Finally, a Title IV-E agency will not have to provide rea-
sonable efforts for family reunification if "[a] court of competent jurisdiction has determined
that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances." Id. § 1356.21(b)(3)(i).
241. Id. § 1356.71(d).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (2012).
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ance with the Act if there is "(i) a voluntary placement agreement entered
into by a parent or [a] legal guardian of the child who is the relative" from
whose home the child is removed or "(ii) a judicial determination to the
effect that continuation in the home from which removed would be contrary
to the welfare of the child and that reasonable efforts of the type described
in [the Act] for a child have been made." "
Long-term foster care for children expanded in scope with passage of
legislation in 2008, the Fostering Connections Act.2 4 Gradually the follow-
ing is occurring: (1) the eligibility link to Aid to Families of Dependent
Children is being phased out over time; (2) starting in 2010, special needs
adoptive children age sixteen and older are eligible for federal coverage
without regard to income levels, and the age threshold will be lowered by
two years every year until all special needs adoptions are covered by federal
Title IV-E funding; (3) all siblings placed with an eligible child are covered;
(4) beginning in 2011, states have an option of extending care in kinship-
guardianship cases and special needs adoptions beyond the age of eighteen;
and (5) any child who has been in foster care for five consecutive years will
be eligible for coverage if he or she is a special needs adoption placement.
Federal funding of foster care placements, long-term foster care, and
adoption assistance work in tandem with state budgetary constraints. The
problem is that "[flederal financial reimbursement formulas made foster
care placement more financially advantageous to states than providing
preservation and reunification services."245 This is especially true when
243. Id. § 672(a)(2)(A).
244. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (2008).
Some [children] are in foster care for only a brief period of days or weeks before
being returned to their families. But almost a quarter of a million will remain in
foster care for a year or more. Nearly 50,000 will stay in foster care five years or
more, while 30,000 will remain there until they reach adulthood .... Although
children in long-term foster care represent only a small fraction of the total child
population of the United States, they represent a much bigger portion of the young
people who go on to create serious disciplinary problems in schools, drop out of
high school, become unemployed and homeless, bear children as unmarried teen-
agers, abuse drugs and alcohol, and commit crimes. A recent study of a Midwest
sample of young adults aged twenty-three or twenty-four who had aged out of fos-
ter care found that they had extremely high rates of arrest and incarceration. 81
percent of the long-term foster care males had been arrested at some point, and 59
percent had been convicted of at least one crime. This compares with 17 percent of
all young men in the U.S. who had been arrested, and 10 percent who had been
convicted of a crime. Likewise, 57 percent of the long-term foster care females had
been arrested and 28 percent had been convicted of a crime. The comparative fig-
ures for all female young adults in the U.S. are 4 percent and 2 percent, respective-
ly.
ZILL, supra note 89, at 2.
245. Crossley, supra note 63, at 275-76.
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there are no enforceable federal guidelines as to what constitutes reasonable
efforts. State courts and legislatures comment on the reasonableness of de-
creasing efforts to correspond with decreasing state revenues; foster care
provides for a safe alternative for the child.
Parents who are poor, medically and mentally challenged, marginal-
ized because of language or background, and single are often victimized by
such a system. Any response must include more effective utilization of ex-
isting efforts to keep a child in the home and should focus on rectifying
those conditions that have resulted in removal of the child. Furthermore, any
response should continue efforts to reduce reentry into the dependency and,
overall, provide a better argument for what efforts are needed and deserved.
CASAs contribute to this response.
IV. COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES
A. Program Overview
The practice of using CASAs began in the courtroom of a superior
court in Seattle, Washington.246 To ensure that he was getting all of the facts
to provide for the long-term welfare of the children appearing before him,
the judge "obtained funding to recruit and train community volunteers [to
speak] on behalf of the[se] children." 47 The pilot program began in 1977,
and after, it was replicated throughout the country.248 An association was
formed in 1982, entitled the National Court Appointed Special Advocate
Association.249 There has been steady recognition and expansion of the pro-
gram with the American Bar Association officially endorsing the use of
CASA volunteers in 1989 to work alongside attorneys representing abused
and neglected children °.2 " Later, "in 1996, Congress authorized the expan-
sion of the CASA program by amending CAPTA to include CASA volun-
teers as [permissible] guardians ad litem. ''2 '
Today, the National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association
reports that in 2011 there were forty-six statewide CASA/GAL organiza-





251. Id. Congress further expanded the CASA program with the enactment of the
Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, which states that a "court-appointed special advocate
shall be available to every victim of child abuse or neglect in the United States that needs
such an advocate." Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 216, 104
Stat. 4792, 4794 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13012 (2012)).
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tions, comprising 946 local and state programs. 2 2 The 2010 CASA sum-
mary report on the various state organizations reports that "[s]tate programs
range from state-funded, state-administered programs to nonprofit organiza-
tions that grew from informal networks of CASA program directors. 253 The
summary report provides information on each of the states that provides
CASA services, together with links to state statutes, court rules, and state
organization webpages.21 Detailed information is provided pertaining to the
structure of each state office, the number of children served, the number of
volunteers, the amount of funding revenues, and the amount of office ex-
penditures."' Statistics provided indicate that Florida had the largest number
of children being served by CASA volunteers, 55,764 children served in
2010; there were 6,670 volunteers. 6 Utah had the fewest number of chil-
dren served, 269, but the state CASA program had 280 volunteers.257
Analyzed in the context of what best serves the interest of children in-
volved in dependency proceedings, commentators lament the absence of
strong empirical evidence as to the efficacy of CASA volunteers, but their
assessments taken from interviews are generally positive. One 2004 study
reported the following: (1) that the CASA volunteers
are [far] more likely to have face-to-face contact with the children and their care
providers ... to file written reports with the court... [and] continuity of represen-
tation and documentation ... when one considers the high turnover of county so-
cial workers and the rotation of private attorneys through the dependency court;
258
(2) "that children represented by a CASA advocate had more services or-
dered and more actually implemented and ... they tended to have slightly
fewer placements"; 259 (3) "children with CASA support are more likely to
252. NAT'L COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE ASs'N, 2011 STATE
ORGANIZATION SURVEY REPORT 4 (2011), available at
http://nc.casaforchildren.org/files/public/community/programs/Statistics/201 I-State Organiz
ationSurvey.pdf. State statutes may create the program. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-
151 to -157 (2006). See generally Shireen Y. Husain, A Voice for the Voiceless: A Child's
Right to Legal Representation in Dependency Proceedings, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232
(2010) (discussing the current laws for children in dependency proceedings in the fifty
states).
253. NAT'L COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE Ass'N, 2010 STATE OF THE




255. See, e.g., id. at 9-10.
256. See id. at 25.
257. See id. at 94.
258. Davin Youngclarke, Kathleen Dyer Ramos & Lorraine Granger-Merkle, A Sys-
tematic Review of the Impact of Court Appointed Special Advocates, 5 J. CENTER FOR FAMS.,
CHILD. &CTS. 109, 121 (2004).
259. Id.
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be adopted than those with other representation";2" (4) "children with
CASA support appear to be less likely to reenter the foster-care system once
their cases are dismissed";26" ' and (5):
[p]reliminary findings [citing Child Advocates, Inc.] suggest that CASA volunteers
positively affect children's self-esteem, their attitudes about the future, and their
ability to work with others, as well as help control deviant behavior. The children's
caregivers also appear to benefit in the areas of communication and family rituals.
Patterns of communication and rituals in families are general markers for the over-
all health of the family system.
262
CASA volunteers do not have to be attorneys, and they often work in
tandem with attorneys, appointed as GAL advocates for children. 63 In 2009,
the National Association of Counsel for Children issued a report evaluating
the GAL system in Nebraska. 2' The report was written in response to re-
quest by the state legislature to evaluate the GAL system on fifteen different
measures. 265 The report was critical of the state's system of child representa-
tion, finding that "significant reform is needed to bring Nebraska's child
representation system into line with national standards. 266 But in reference
to CASA, the report concluded that "having a CASA assigned to a case
expanded the breadth and depth of information provided to the court, that
CASA reports were more helpful to judges than those of caseworkers and
GALs, and that CASAs are more likely to visit the child in the home. 267
Strikingly, throughout the report, comments from caseworkers, CASA
volunteers, and Foster Care Review Board Members revealed the depth of
interaction between the CASA and the child; this was in contrast to the
GAL and the child. In interviews with CASAs the Association reported
that "GALs develop a very poor relationship with their clients[,]" they "absolutely
do not" develop relationships with their clients, and sometimes they develop a rela-
tionship and sometimes they do not. One CASA explained that in one case, the
GAL only sees the child right before the court hearing and in another case, the
GAL attends meetings and conferences and listens to the CASA. One CASA
commented, "GALs probably understand the children's needs in general. But un-
less the children are brought to the GAL, GALs would never check up on them."
268
260. Id.
261. Id. The study later reports that "[p]erhaps the only outcome with clear external
relevance is reentry into the court system; and, notably, each of the studies that explored
reentry reported that children who had been assigned to CASA volunteers were approximate-
ly 50 percent less likely to reenter the dependency system." Id. at 122.
262. Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted).
263. Id. at 109-12.
264. NACC NEBRASKA GAL REPORT, supra note 21, at vi.
265. Id.
266. Id. at xi.
267. Id. at 14-15.
268. Id. at 107.
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The theme of personal interaction between child and child advocate
forms one of the recommendations of the Association's report: "Recom-
mendation 3: The relationship between the GAL and the child must be
changed to become client-focused, not adult-focused .... Attorneys should
be required to provide their contact information (telephone and e-mail ad-
dress) to clients age 10 and older, and to caretakers for all of their cli-
ents. 269
When CASAs commented on the advocacy skills of GALs, the Na-
tional Association of Counsel for Children reported that some of the CASAs
stated, "[lt is difficult to advocate for someone whom the GALs have never
met or spent any time with. 27° CASAs also commented that the GALs "rely
too much on [agency] reports and what they assume the court will do.
271
And when GALs were asked about working with CASA volunteers, one
said that "it was 'rough' working with them because they 'overstep their
bounds in making legal determinations that they're not qualified to do.'
27 2
But most of the comments from GALs reported in the Association study
were consistent in describing the CASAs as "'uniquely dedicated to chil-
dren and very caring and devoted people[,]' . . . [they provide] 'another set
of eyes and ears' . . . [and] day-to-day updates on children's lives. "273
B. Effective Utilization
In assessing the effectiveness of advocating for the best interests of a
child in a dependency case, there is no single approach. Individual circum-
stances abound and the most common denominator is poverty, a poverty
exacerbated by the recession beginning in 2008. As a consequence, an in-
creasing number of children are entering the child welfare system and, cor-
respondingly, foster care. And while "[flederal financial reimbursement
formulas made foster care placement more financially advantageous to [the]
states than providing preservation and reunification services,"2174 these ser-
vices-reasonable efforts-are needed more than ever. Decreasing state
revenues are resulting in decreasing state efforts to reunify families. It is
arguable that the federal support of foster care and adoption, plus federal
statutory time frames for compliance, creates the milieu that results in ter-
mination of parental rights of those most vulnerable.
But what can be done? First, federal priorities could shift and state
reasonable efforts at reunification could receive additional federal support.
269. Id. at 193 (emphasis omitted).
270. Id. at 123.
271. Id. at 127.
272. Id. at 136.
273. Id.
274. Crossley, supra note 63, at 275-76.
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There is some indication of this in the most recent budget, but the monetary
support is still insufficient to term this a solution. Second, attorneys ap-
pointed as GALs could be more accountable. This is a part of an overall
response recommended by many child advocacy reports, suggesting that
any child advocate must interact with the child, and the "weight of academic
and practitioner opinion suggests that without the legal representation, a
child has little prospect of successfully navigating the complexities of de-
pendency proceedings." '275 The advocate's interaction with the child and the
necessity of legal representation are included in the following recommenda-
tions:
(1) Attorneys must develop a bond with their client[,] ... engage more with chil-
dren by having frequent and more meaningful contact[,] ... [and] understand
the child's living situation, school, and home life[;]
(2) Effective representation includes a thorough investigation in order to develop
a clear theory of the case and effectively advocate in court[;]
(3) Attorneys effectively solve problems for their clients by engaging in active
out-of-court advocacy... seeking solutions on behalf of the child[;]
(4) Attorneys should take a holistic view of the child's needs... [and] monitor a
vast array of services, as well as coordinate other legal issues, such as finan-
cial assistance or educational programs[;]
(5) Practice in this area requires comprehensive training, which includes child
and family issues[,] . . . [and the] need to understand ... agency policies and
procedures[,] ... courtroom skills and a grounding in children's law[;]
(6) Attorneys must meet initial and ongoing qualifications standards[]
(7) Additional support can help attorneys accomplish the multiple tasks that allow
them to be successful advocates[, and] [aittorneys need ... assistance [from]
investigators [and] social workers, and strong supervising skills[; and]
(8) Caseloads must be reasonable so that attorneys can accomplish their essential
duties. 6
During better economic times, it is feasible that the goals for attorney
advocacy just listed could be accomplished. But this is a debate that is best
left for when those times occur. In the meantime, the number of children in
foster care increases, there is an inadequate standard as to what constitutes
reasonable services, private action to enforce states to provide reasonable
efforts is lacking, and judicial and legislative comments ratify reductions in
efforts presently offered by states to reunify families where cause exists.
Prudence dictates that more immediate responses should be fostered. Based
on what empirical evidence exists, CASA volunteers working with attor-
275. See Duquette with Darwall, supra note 20, at 90. The article reports that the
"team [providing data for the conclusions] talked with judges, attorneys, caseworkers,
CASAs, state regional office directors, tribes, and children themselves." Id. at 120.
276. Id. at 120-21.
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neys can effectively advocate for children, their families, the process of
dependency, and greater pursuit of equality for those who are the most vic-
timized during the worst of times.
CONCLUSION
Providing adequate child protective service is a complex endeavor.
The 2008 economic recession has had a profound impact on the ability of
government-state and federal-to respond to what always occurs during
recession: greater child dependency. Moreover, the inability to respond ade-
quately is not recent or sudden; rather, foster care drift, inadequate reasona-
ble efforts to keep families together, federal monetary policies, and refusal
of parents to rectify abhorrent behaviors is perennial. But this Article advo-
cates that something be done now to respond to the present dilemma. Ad-
mittedly, long-term solutions must be set in place. But immediately, greater
attention must be paid to CASAs. There is sufficient evidence that they are
effective advocates for children and parents. CASAs are educated enough to
participate in the child-protective system, they take advantage of communi-
ty resources, and they are volunteers, not constrained by salary or time
clocks. These CASA volunteers should not act alone, but rather in tandem
with attorneys. This model is recommended by sufficient commentators to
warrant its implementation. But the time to begin is now, before what is an
unreasonable usurpation of equality becomes reasonable.
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